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Donald N. McCloskey and J. Richard Zecher
2.1 Two Views of the International Economy
and Why They Matter
A model of the economic life of nations that emphasizes the mutual
interdependence of the nations is easy to believe in a period of relative
tranquility, such as the heyday ofthe gold standard, 1880-1914, orofthe
gold-dollar standard, 1945-71. In less tranquil periods, such as the thirty
yearsofwarand depressionfrom 1914 to 1945 orthedecade justpast, one
might suppose thatthe history is less favorable to the model. Wepropose
to show thatthis supposition is misleading, andthatinterdependencewas
strong. The strength of interdependence depends on the strength of
purchasing-powerparity. Andpurchasing-powerparityis strongerthanit
looks.
Purchasing-powerparityhas recently been much in the scholarly news.
Some of the new interest in an old idea is attributable to the recent
turbulence ofinternational finances, giving practical reasons for wanting
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to know when exchange rates or prices are in equilibrium. But some
interest is a result ofautonomous intellectual change by itself. The chief
ofthese changes was the monetary approach to the balance ofpayments
developed in the early 1970s by Robert Mundell and his students, with
involvement by HarryJohnson, Ronald McKinnon, Jeffrey Williamson,
and various others.
The monetary approach can do without the law ofone price.
1 One can
approachthe balanceofpaymentsas a monetaryphenomenon-thatis to
say, not primarily the real phenomenon that the elasticities approach
believes it to be-without committing oneself to any particular view of
the working ofinternational arbitrage. The monetary approach, afterall,
merely notes that the balance of payments is by definition a balance on
monetary account (just as the current balance is a balance on commodity
account and the capital account is a balance on an account of future
claims), then makes the innocent-sounding suggestion that its explana-
tion might focus on the excess supply ofand demand for money. It is not
essential to adopt purchasing-power parity to believe that there may be
merit in this view.
Nonetheless, purchasing-power parity was in fact commonly invoked
in the early theorizing in the monetary approach. Those present at the
creationin Chicago in thelate 1960s and early 1970s felt they were merely
appropriating for use in the study ofmonetary affairs an assumption that
was a necessary commonplace in the study ofreal affairs. It is hard to see
how the real theory ofinternational trade could have gotten far without
postulatingenough rationalityonthepartofeconomic actors to arbitrage
away for each commodity any price differences outside the gold points-
the term "gold points" defined to include all the risks and other costs of
transportation. And, to go further, if the gold points were as wide for
many commodities as is often implied in criticisms of purchasing-power
parity, it is hard to see what usefulness there could have been in the
standardpropositionsin therealtheory, such as atendencyto factor price
equalization or a tendency to satisfy the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of
exports or indeed any tendency to equilibrium. The pioneers of the
monetary approach felt they were simply bringing to international
finance the intellectual habits formed in the study of the real theory,
especially the intellectual habit ofsupposing thatpeople exploit opportu-
nities for profit. It is no accident that the second generation ofleaders in
bringing rigor to the study of international trade-the Mundells and
Johnsons, following on the first generation ofSamuelsons and Meades-
were theinventorsofthemonetaryapproachandwere inveterateusersof
the assumption of purchasing-power parity.l
We believe that the doctrine ofpurchasing-power parity, brought into
theorizing about the monetary approach by the back door, should be the
guest of honor. It is a more radical proposition than the one that the123 The Success of Purchasing-Power Parity
nation's liquidity balance (or, still more generally, the asset balance)
probably has much to do with the amount ofmoney it imports orexports.
It challenges in fact the whole way of doing macroeconomics.
The usual way of doing macroeconomics might be called the Martian
approach. A national economy, usually the United States, is taken in its
relations with the rest ofthe world to be similar to Mars. The price level
on Mars, obviously, is determined by Martian demand and supply curves
(whether for money or for aggregate goods is not important); likewise,
the interest rate. An occasional spaceship might land from Earth bearing
gold orFederalReserve notes, therebydriving up theprice level onMars
(or increasing speculative balances in the presence of a liquidity trap-
again, the rest of one's economic ideology is irrelevant to the point at
issue). The arrival of the spaceship might even be occasioned by events
on Mars, but only in a very long run, since it is a long way from Earth to
Mars. Mars is a closed economythat has to adjust to the moneysupplyor
aggregate demand or expectations that Martians have, period.
The Martian approach characterizes 90 percent of the articles and
books on macroeconomics, written mostly by Americans. The theoreti-
cians among them can always argue that it is unimportant to them
whether or not any actual economy matches their models, for they are
concerned with higher things. So much the worse for theory, one might
say. A floor ortwo down the ivory tower the more empirically concerned
theorists can argue, quite correctly, that their models might well apply to
the whole world even if they are inappropriate for one part ofthe world.
It is strange then to include institutions (such as a central bank with a
national policy) in the models that have no worldwide equivalents, one
might say. Empiricists, living with the computer down in the basement,
can and do argue wearily that they are working on a still larger model
(with 10,001 sectors) and will perhaps be able to fit the international
sector into one ofthese. The rest ofthe world is to them merely another,
rather small, sector of the American economy, similar in importance,
say, to office equipment. Theyview an appealtoinclude theinternational
milieu as a tiresome request to further complicate an already complex
model by inserting an office-equipment sector. At the most they are
willing to consider project LINK, with its plan to cure the maladies of
misspecified national models by putting all the models into the same
hospital.
It is notable where the other 10 percent of the books and articles on
macroeconomics originate. They originate from small open economies.
Cassel was Swedish. His countryman, Knut Wicksell (1918), had no
difficulty believing purchasing-powerparity, debating with the American
Taussig (1918) on the matter.
3 The assumption of thoroughgoing arbi-
trage between regions andcountriespervades the work ofHeckscher and
Ohlin. Canadians were the heirs to the Swedes in producing dispro-124 Donald N. McCloskey and J. Richard Zecher
portionate numbers of excellent economists. They too, living with the
great bearofthe United States as the Swedes lived with the great bearof
the German Empire, have found it difficult to think in Martian terms
about their homeland, and even about their new American home. John-
son, McKinnon, and Mundell were raised in Canada, as were many of
their students.
Martian thinkers are accustomed to dismissing such cases with the
remark, "precisely: theycamefrom small economies; the UnitedStatesis
large." The remark is irrelevant, reflecting a common notion that recent
developments in balance-of-payments theory depend somehow on the
assumption that we are dealing with small economies.
The psychological disposition to recognize the existence ofan interna-
tional milieu may be smaller in a big country, but the milieu is still there.
The United States may be so big, to be sure, that it can significantly alter
the world's price level orinterest rate (at least so the finance ministers of
other countries believe). But the American price level and interest rate
are no less the world's on this account. That General Motors is big does
not put it in a different market for automobiles than British Leyland or
Simca. America's money supply may well in some periods act as the
world's high-powered money, with multiple effects (although the usual
accounts of monetarism do not talk this way); America's policy in some
periods may well affect expectations abroad (although the usual accounts
ofrational expectations do not talk this way). Adopting such arguments
would constitute a radical break with Martianism. And in any case it
would entail recognizing that prices and interest rates were world, not
national, phenomena, which is quite another way of doing macroeco-
nomics.
The other way of doing macroeconomics may be called the Iowa City
approach. No one doubts that Iowa City has virtually no control over its
price level and its interest rates. In very short order an attempt by Iowa
City bankers to raise interest rates on loans to twice the market rate
would empty the loan offices of the banks. In rather longer order (a
month, say), an attempt by Iowa City grocers to raise prices to twice the
market would empty the grocery stores. In still longer order (a couple of
years, say), an attempt by house owners to raise rents above the cost and
value of housing determined by the substitutability of housing for other
goods in production and consumption would empty the city.
Likewise, no one would believe there was a useful sense in which Iowa
City could have a monetary policy. It could impose tariffs or price
controls, to be sure. But the more usual and subtle instruments of
monetary policy would be blunt in the hands ofthe First National Bank.
If Iowa City had its own money supply (and under the free-banking
legislation before the CivilWarit, like manyAmericancities, in fact did),
increasing the money supply would have no effect on the Iowa City price125 The Success of Purchasing-Power Parity
level or interest rate, so long as the exchange rate was fixed. No econo-
mist would place any credence in a model of the economy of Iowa City
thatallowed Iowa City's prices and interest rates to be determinedwholly
or even largely within Iowa City by the forces ofaggregate demand and
supply.
The choice is one between a world in which purchasing-power parity
does and does notwork well enough to be a good description. Is the price
level ofthe United States (when the exchange rate is fixed) substantially
or importantly free to move independent ofthe price level ofthe rest of
the world? Is the United States (or the United Kingdom or whatever)
more like Mars or is it like Iowa City?
The choice between the Martian and the Iowa City approaches is an
empirical one. TheUnitedStatesis not literallyeitherMars orIowaCity.
The question is which approach is closer to the truth, or if you prefer,
which mix of the two is true. In particular, it is not enough to remark
blandly that both approaches apply to some degree and then proceed to
use one or the other to buttress some conclusion on policy or history.
Formuch ofthe period 1880 to the present the majoreconomicpowers
were on literally or virtually fixed exchange rates, and it is to such a case
that the argument applies most easily. But it is not true, as some think,
that a regime offlexible exchange rates completely unhinges an economy
from the world market. With a correctionfor the exchange rate, purchas-
ing-power parity might still apply (though one would expect uninsurable
exchange risk to make the gold points wider). And if purchasing-power
parity does apply, then the central bankcan have only a neutral effect on
the economy. The bank would be free to push the general price level up
or down (and could just as well make the exchange rate the policy
instrument as the money supply), but could not alter relative prices,
pegged by world markets. Relative prices-for instance price of invest-
ment goods relative to consumer goods-are commonly objects of
monetary policy. Thecommon objectives are unattainable ifpurchasing-
powerparityworks well. And, to repeat, ifgovernments bindthemselves
to a fixed exchange rate, they cannot even have a neutral influence on
prices.
Another red herring sometimes drawn across the trail should be
avoided as well: purchasing-power parity is assured in the very long run
by the price-specie-flow mechanism. Therefore, the argument goes, the
monetary approach, which assumes that markets operate very quickly
among nations, is merely another way ofexpressing conventional mone-
tarism, which assumes that markets do not operate quickly among
nations.
4
The argument is misleading. The price-specie-flow mechanism is a
disequilibrium model. It is essentially that two economies that for some
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generate flows of gold that will realign the parities. By contrast, the
monetary approach, subspecies purchasing-power parity, is an equilib-
rium model. Itclaims, nonetheless, by virtue ofan alleged quickness with
which price divergences among countries are arbitraged away, to be
relevant to a much shorterrun than could reasonably besupposedfor the
other. Thatin onerespect (namely, purchasing-powerparity) the models
happen to have the same outcome in the long run should not be allowed
to obscure that the two exhibit radically different behavior in most other
ways. In particular, monetary policy does work in the price-specie-flow
model (at least in some short run and at least if the model does not belie
itself by introducing a rapid price-specie flow) but does not work in the
purchasing-power-parity model except by way ofinfluences on the world
money supply. The monetary approach takes much from monetarism
but, in the end, differs importantly from the monetarist aproach to
national monetary policy.
We should point out that the historical record contains little evidence
that the price-specie-flow mechanism actually happened. Economists,
accustomed to thinking of the Facts ofHistory, may be surprised; it will
notsurprise historians, hardened to the ubiquity ofthe Myths ofHistory.
The intellectual status ofthe mechanism is similar to the kinked demand
curve of oligopolists: it does not work empirically and is unreasonable
besides (for instance, it would provide opportunities for speculative
profit).
In an earlierpaper (1976, p. 367) we reviewed the empirical anomalies
in the price-specie-flow mechanism. For instance, we argued that Milton
Friedman andAnnaSchwartzmisappliedthe mechanism to an episodein
American history. The United States went back on the gold standard in
January 1879 at the pre-Civil War parity. The American price level was
too low for the parity, allegedly setting the mechanism in motion. Over
the next three years, Friedman andSchwartz arguedfrom annualfigures,
gold flowed in and the price level rose just as Hume would have had it.
They conclude (1963, p. 99) that "itwould be hard to find a much neater
example in history of the classical gold-standard mechanism in opera-
tion." On the contrary, however, we believe it seems much more like an
example of purchasing-power parity and the monetary approach than of
the Humean mechanism. In the monthly statistics (Friedman and
Schwartz confined themselves to annual data), there is no tendency for
pricerises tofollow inflows ofgold, as theyshouldin theprice-specie-flow
mechanism; if anything, there is a slight tendency for price rises to
precede inflows ofgold, as they would if arbitrage were shortcutting the
mechanism and leaving Americans with higher prices directly and a
higher demandfor gold. Whetherornotthe episodeis a good exampleof
the monetary theory, it is a poor example of the price-specie-flow
mechanism .5127 The Success of Purchasing-Power Parity
The price-specie-flow mechanism, therefore, is not a good way to
harmonize closed-economy monetarism with the fact that we live in a
world ofmanyeconomies. Whatshouldbe clearby now is thatifpurchas-
ing-power parity is found to be a useful characterization of the world,
then closed-economy theorizing and empirical work in macroeconomics
should be changed to allow for the direct effects of international price
arbitrage. Whether monetarists or Keynesians or rational expectation-
ists, economists should begin thinking and measuring in global terms.
2.2 The Root Definition of
Purchasing-Power Parity
"Come, come," the representative Martian will say, "don't waste my
time-we know that prices diverge. Purchasing-power parityfails." That
prices are notidentical everywhere is not an importantfailure ofpurchas-
ing-power parity. A minor reply is thatprices can be different in level but
related in their changes, a distinction made in the usual statistical tests of
parity. The main reply is that purchasing-power parity is a consequence
of rationality in arbitraging. If all the opportunities for riskless (or in-
sured) arbitrage among countries that are profitable at existing interest
rates and othercosts ofarbitrage have taken place, then the price level of
the world may besaid to have exhausted its ability to determine theprice
level of one country.
Now it may have exhausted it, yet be trivial. To take the single
commoditycase for illustration (andonlyfor illustration, it being a major
theme below that commodity-by-commodity arguments do not suffice),
the gold points might be so wide that even though they are not violated
they are not useful as describing a constraint onthe economy. Wheatand
boomerangs in Rumania and Tasmania in 1682 (or in 1982?) may have
offered no opportunities for profit by arbitrage ex ante, yet their prices
were surely free to move within wide limits independent of each other.
Our hypothesis is that in the modern world among the main trading
nations the forces ofrationality in arbitrage were powerful enough to fix
anyone general price level and interest rate ceteris paribus, in terms of
the others.
The usual statistical question is whether or not the result is a unit
elasticity of one price level with respect to another. We shall see in a
moment whether the statistical question is the right one. But the price
level in one country could be determined by the world in the sense that it
was fixed ceteris paribus by the action ofarbitrageurs-evenifthe elastic-
ity were not unity. For this reason arguments that ratios of purchasing-
power parities tend to drift are irrelevant.
6 They do drift, just as demand
curves drift. To say that the law of demand fails because in an uncon-
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with thequantitieswould beanerror. So toohere. Thearbitrageurscould
be making the American price level exogenous to, say, American mone-
tary policy even if changing technologies of traded as against nontraded
goods, changing compositions ofmarket baskets, and changing errors in
the underlying statistics caused the American price level to be poorly
correlated with other price levels.
It is easy to construct examples that illustrate the point. Imagine that
electrical equipment produced in the United States sells for 20 percent
more than that produced in Germany, after translating the prices at the
exchange rate, because of differences in the energy efficiency of the
equipment. Imagine further that deviations as little as plus or minus one
percentage point from the 20-percent differential would create opportu-
nities for profitable arbitrage, exploited instantly. Now suppose the
equilibrium price ratio rises (that is, the ratio dividing profitable from
unprofitable arbitrage) suddenly to 30 percent from 20 percent, because
of changes in energy prices (worldwide). Suppose finally that the same
plus-or-minus-one-percentage-point band exists at the 30-percent dif-
ferential as attheold20-percentdifferential. Theeconomiststumbling on
such data might conclude that parityfails: the drift from a 20-percent to a
30-percent differential would be interpreted by him as indicating the
poornessofcorrelationbetweenpricesinoneplace andin another.Yetin
the sense relevant here ofceteris paribus the prices in Germany and the
United States are mutually linked (plus or minus one percentage point)
just as strongly at 30 percent as at 20 percent. A monetary policy in the
United States that had as one intended result a rise in electri-
cal-equipmentpricesin theUnitedStatesrelative to (exchange-adjusted)
German prices would fail.
Wewish, then, to appropriatefor purchasing-powerparitytheprestige
ofthe postulateofrationality. Itsurpasses beliefthatmany opportunities
to makeeasymoney buyinglow andselling high persistlongenough to be
observed in economic data. Yet much of the opposition to purchasing-
power parity seems to believe that it is so. When specialists in finance
such as Richard Roll (1979) think about international markets, they
assume with hardly a comment that all opportunities for arbitrage are
exhausted in a matter of weeks. Roll remarks that "in the monetary
approach... prices and exchange rates tend toward equilibrium ... in
the very long run, say a year or more" (italics added; p. 135).1 His
criticisms ofthe monetary approach come from a novel direction: instead
ofcriticizing the approach for supposing that the long run is as short as a
year, he criticizes it for supposing that the long run is as long as a year.
The view from finance is refreshing and highly relevant. We consider
purchasing-power parity to be a proposition similar in more ways than
one to the efficient-markets hypothesis, to be demonstrated on similar
grounds, namely, on the ground of the shared belief of economists in129 The Success of Purchasing-Power Parity
rationality and on grounds of whatever evidence can be adduced to
confront the belief. The beliefis that there must be nothing systematicor
predictable in thefuture ofpricesin onecountryrelative topresentprices
in another (except, indeed, instantaneous equality), or else there is
money to be made in exploiting the prediction. If differences in price
levels take years to be eliminated by trade, then trade right now-in one
commodity or in the CPI-is profitable. The result, we believe, is a
"theorem" linking the pursuit ofprofit and the exogeneity ofthe general
price level. Ifopportunities for arbitrage are exploited (allowing fully for
thecost oftransportand information), then theprice level ofonecountry
is fixed by the rest ofthe world, even in the very shortrun. The argument
is not a test by itself, but merely a theorem, a higher-order proposition
aboutthe relation betweenequilibrium and the exogeneityofprices. The
theorem is a curious product, to be sure, for it is not merely a logical
proposition. It requires the world to be arranged in a certain way to be
true. We arrive again at an empirical question.
Three points oflogic nonetheless may make the fundamental theorem
ofthe Iowa City approach more palatable. First, arbitrage does not need
to occur commodity by commodity. All prices in an economy are con-
nected to each other. Prices of bricks in New York and London are held
together not only by thp. direct forces ofarbitrage in the marketfor bricks
itself, weak as they are, but by the indirect forces ofarbitrage in related
markets-the markets for brick-making labor, say, or the market for
lumber for which bricks are a substitute. That nontraded goods exist is
sometimesthoughtto bea rebuttalto purchasing-powerparity. Notso, at
least if the nontraded goods are provided in markets sensitive to costs
(militarybases, for instance, maybe anexception). Itis also thoughtto be
a rebuttal to note that the law of one price need not hold for such-and-
suchcommodityifthatcommodity'smarketis obstructed. Notso, atleast
ifthe commodityin question is related in production and consumption to
othergoods. Commodity-by-commoditythinkingcanbemisleading. The
simplest form of the argument is the Walrasian point that one absolute
price (the numeraire) serves to set all other prices in the economy, given
resources, technology, and tastes. At the extreme, then, if Mars were
connected to Earth by the market in chewing gum alone, the two price
levels would nonetheless be fixed in relation to each other. How much
tighter, one might suppose, would be the relation between two econo-
mies connected by the prices of thousands of goods and services.
A second point of logic, seldom recognized, is that arbitrage across
space down to the extent of the transport-cost wedge is reinforced, for
storable commodities (housing, wheat, automobiles, cement), by arbi-
trage across time down to thewedgeofstoragecosts. Supposethepriceof
cement rises in the United States because demand has risen. One might
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United States, that it takes time to reorganize the direction oftransport.
Butifthe cementprice is expectedeventually to take up its usual relation
with foreign prices, then the present relation is constrained-it cannot
deviate from the long-run relation by more than the cost of "transport-
ing" cement from the long into the short run. The argument applies even
to nontradable goods: if the forces of general equilibrium would even-
tually bring even housing prices, say, into a rough parity, then the
storability of housing will enforce the parity earlier.
A thirdpointis that a properlymeasuredprice indexwould be an index
of characteristics, not named goods and services. The imperfections of
the usual price indexes should not be used as evidence for the failure of
purchasing-power parity, whether the imperfection is a sheer error in
reporting or, as here, an error of concept. It is commonly argued that
goods and services, especially manufactured goods, are not perfect sub-
stitutes across countries, that the category "vacuum cleaners" contains
Panasonic (Matsushita Electric) model Me-881 and Sears Power-Mate
model 20 A 2099 with different characteristics, and therefore that depar-
tures from the gold points are rational. The argument is that competition
between the two models ofvacuum cleaners is not perfect. The response
must be, for onething, thatthedegree ofmonopolyin internationaltrade
is beside the point. Matsushita Electric might well be discriminating in
the prices it sets for vacuum cleaners in Japan and in the United States,
yet it would still be true that there was a stable relationship between the
Japanese and the American price determined, say, by relative elasticities
of demand. For another thing, the characteristics making up the good
may well have perfectmarkets. Vacuumingpower, easeofuse, reliability
ofservice, and the like are separatelymeasurable, at least in the consum-
er's mind, and each is perfectly substitutable across brand names. The
bundle of characteristics called a Panasonic vacuum cleaner may not be
exactly duplicated in any othervacuum cleaner, but the price ofvacuum-
ing power may be set on a competitive market. Another way of making
the point is to think of the prices of named goods and services as being
composed, speaking statistically, of many factors in principal compo-
nents, shared with many other goods. This is a statistical way of stating
the general equilibrium point: what must be arbitraged is a relatively
small number ofcharacteristics, not each ofmillions ofnamed goods and
services one by one. The degree ofidentity in products across countriesis
no more relevant than is the degree ofidentity ofother measures ofthe
composition of consumption.
2.3 Tests of the Efficacy of Arbitrage
Thus armed against irrelevant doubt, we turn to the empirical ques-
tions. Onecan cast light onthe degree ofthoroughness ofequilibrium (or131 The Success of Purchasing-Power Parity
"arbitrage") by measuring it directly. The measurement is extremely
difficult, essentially because a measuremententailssecond-guessingpeo-
ple in the business. If the right amount of resources is being used for
arbitrage, then prices in one place are not free to move independent of
prices elsewhere. To deny purchasing-power parity in this behavioral
sense is to deny that the right amount of resources is being used for
arbitrage. Often unrecognized by critics of purchasing-power parity is
that their conclusion that it has failed usually implies an ability to make
money. Anyonewho knewthatpurchasing-powerparitywas truein some
long run butnotyet truein thepresentwould have a rosy financial future.
The divergences from purchasing-power parity detected in the literature
are so gross and the statistics purporting to show the divergences so easy
to collect thattheopportunitiesfor profit are large. Gothee andprosper.
The only direct test of the rationality of arbitrageurs, then, is literal
second-guessing. That is, one assembles the facts onprices and transport
costs, being careful to allow for such subtleties as the cost-of-exchange
risk between the time the arbitrage opportunity arises and the time it is
exploited, and does the calculation thatthe arbitrageuse presumablydid,
orshould have done. She herselfwould use listpricesonlyafterascertain-
ing that they reflected prices at which she could actually transact, allow-
ing for delivery lags, credit terms, and risk of default. If she missed a
profitable opportunity, one can either doubt the completeness of one's
calculations or doubt her rationality, depending on the strength ofone's
devotion to theworking hypothesis ofrationality. Thetest is verydifficult
to perform, though it has the compensating merit ofbeing most relevant
to the question at issue. We urge others to attempt it.
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Another, more practical test is to examine whether the shipments of
goods implied by the supposed opportunities for arbitrage in fact oc-
curred. Enthusiasts of purchasing-power parity would argue that the
merethreatofsuchflows suffices to bringpricesspeedilybacktounprofit-
able levels of divergence. Doubters of purchasing-power parity would
argue that only the flows themselves suffice, and these only over a
considerable period. Taking the doubters' view, then, the flows them-
selves should be observable. A country that exhibits divergences from
purchasing-power parity convincing to the doubters should also exhibit
lowered exports and increased imports, a trade deficit: a place with
"high" prices would have a hard time selling and an easy time buying.
Thereasoning is, ofcourse, thefirst stepin theelasticitiesapproachtothe
balanceofpayments. Inotherwords, the balance oftradeshould become
more negative for a countrythatwas above its trendofpurchasing-power
parity.
Nothing of the sort shows through in the U.S. statistics. One would
expect excessive U.S. inflation to hurt U.S. exports. That is, one would
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a rise in the difference between the U.S. price index and the U.K. or
Canadian price index in U.S. dollars, to cause a fall in the trade balance.
The equationfor the United Kingdom meets the expectation: the sign on
d (Pus - ePUK) is indeed negative (standard errors in parentheses):
[
Change in U.S. trade] = 5.3 - 2.8[d(Pus- ePUK)].
balance with U.K. (19.3) (2.5)
The Durbin-Watson is 1.59, in the indeterminant range, but of course
much better than the result of running the levels instead of the differ-
ences. The slope coefficient, however, is insignificant at conventional
levels (notice thatthe insignificance oftheconstant indicates thatthere is
no linear trend to worry about). It is unclear what insignificance might
mean with observations that are not a sample but the universe of the
relevant U.S. and British variables in the period. The R2 ofthe equation
is a mere .02. It is clear what that means.
The equation for Canada, which in view of its contiguity with the
United States should prove a better test, is worse:
[
Change in U.S. trade] = 3.5 + 0.61[d(Pus- eP Can)].
balance with Canada (6.1) (0.73)
The sign is perverse, the R
2 only .01, and again the coefficients are
insignificant .9
One could certainly raise the R2,s here and perhaps correct the sign by
embarking on a search through all possible specifications of lags and
functional forms and periods. Forinstance, from 1880 to 1912 the United
States deflates faster (down to 1896, the usual turning point for price
series in the period), then inflates faster than the United Kingdom and
Canada. True to expectations, the trade balance with the United King-
dom (though not with Canada) exhibits the same U, but inverted. U.K.
clamor about German and U.S. competition becomes great in the 1890s
and diminishes in the Edwardian boomofexports andinvestmentabroad
thatfollowed. Butsuch evidence would have to contendwith a markedly
parallel movement of net U.S. inflation and net U.S. exports-the re-
verse ofexpectations-relativeto both the United Kingdom and Canada
during the 1920s and 1930s.
In otherwords, the apparent deviations from purchasing-power parity
appearnotto representunexploitedopportunitiesfor arbitrage. Another
way to say it is that the deviations were only apparent. The "deviations"
could be, for instance, the result of peculiarities in the price indexes-
U.S. price indexes are always morevolatile thanthe U.K. onesin the late
nineteenthcentury, which maywell say more abouthowtheindexeswere
constructed than about the underlying real character ofprice formation.
The rise and fall ofnet exports to the United Kingdom, then, could be a
result ofmatterswholly internal to the countries, such as building booms133 The Success of Purchasing-Power Parity
in the face of industrial maturity. Alternatively, the "deviations" could
be once-for-all (orfor-the-duration) changes in the cost ofmoving goods
from oneplace to another, as it appears are theviolent leaps up anddown
ofparityduringthe GreatWar. Changesin tariffs orin otherlegalcostsof
movementcan permit a change in the relative position oftwo price levels
without in any way belying the assertion that the price levels are not free
to move where they will. Such a tariff inflation appears to have taken
placein Germanyduringthe 1880s (althoughwe have notas yet beenable
to find out how powerful the explanation is). While prices fell elsewhere,
led by agricultural prices responding to competition from Russia and the
United States, prices in Germany held up, as Bismarck forged a tariff
politics of rye and iron. Further tests of the hypothesis that profitable
opportunities for arbitrage arise when measured prices diverge might
proceed commodity by commodity, but the aggregate results at least are
unpromising for the hypothesis.
2.4 The Irrelevance of Price Regressions Unadorned
The representative Martian will by now be close to apoplexy. "In-
numerable regressions of one country's prices on another have been
performed recently, and halfofthem show that purchasing-power parity
fails. Surely such tests are conclusive."
No, they are not. There are two points here. The first, the more
fundamental, is thattheregressions arenot useful tests ofourhypothesis,
which has to do with the rationality ofarbitrageurs, not with how closely
one price correlates with another. Our hypothesis says that prices are
linkedand thereforeinsensitive tointernalforces such as monetarypolicy
(as we shall show presently), not that the prices are linked by some linear
relationship having such-and-such a slope.
The second point is that even the hypothesis of linear relationship,
which unlike ours is not based on a foundation ofindividual rationality,
has been tested inadequately. The tests take the form ofregressing, say,
the U.S. GNP deflator on the U.K. GNP deflator multiplied by the
exchange rate of dollars for pounds.
Pus = a + J3[(e)(PUK)] + error term.
Ifthe slope coefficient J3 is significantly different from 1.0 at conventional
levels, then purchasing-powerparityis said to fail. A numberofcriticisms
can be and have been leveled at such equations, although none is the
main point here. It can be argued, for instance, that allowing for simul-
taneity bias brings the J3 coefficient closer to 1.0 (Krugman 1978). It can
be argued thattheequationis misspecified, not allowing properlyfor lags
or for secular trends. It can be argued that "significance" is beside the
point for a nonsample. It can be argued that the prices, especially the134 Donald N. McCloskey and J. Richard Zecher
foreign prices on the right-hand side, are measured in error, as they are
for instance if the United Kingdom is taken to stand for the world in the
calculation of prices, biasing the coefficient towards zero. It can be
argued that the slope coefficient could differ from 1.0 if such a difference
were implied by the Walrasian general equilibrium. It can be argued that
thewhole procedureis misleading, because any coefficient different from
zero bespeaksa relationshipbetweendomesticandforeign prices danger-
ous to ignore in explaining domestic prices. Itcan be arguedthatto judge
the hypothesis ofparity a failure, and to abandon it, is to flee to evils that
we know not of.
The main point, however, is that the "failure" of purchasing-power
parity in such an equation is not measured against a standard. How close
does theslope have to be totheidealof1.00tosay thatpurchasing-power
parity succeeds? The literature is silent. The standard used is the
irrelevant one ofstatistical significance. A sample size ofa million yield-
ing a tight estimate that the slope was .9999, significantly different from
1.00000, could beproducedas evidence thatpurchasing-powerparityhad
"failed", at least if the logic of the usual method were to be followed
consistently. Commonsense, presumably, would rescue thescholarfrom
asserting that an estimate of .9999 with a standard error of .0000001 was
significantly different from unity in a significant meaning ofsignificance.
Such logic also could be applied to findings of slopes of .90 or 1.20, but
usually it is not.
lD
The point is not that levels ofsignificance are arbitrary. Ofcourse they
are. The point is that it is not known whether the range picked out by the
level ofsignificance affirms ordenies the hypothesis. Noris the pointthat
econometric tests are to be disdained. Quite the contrary. The point is
that the econometric tests have not followed their own rhetoric of
hypothesis testing. Forone thing, as we have said, the errors that tests of
significance dealwith areerrorsofsampling, butin manycases thereis no
sampling involved: we have the entire universe of observations of the
general price level in the United States and the United Kingdom 1880-
1940. Foranother, nowhere in the literature oftests ofpurchasing-power
paritydoesthereappeara loss function. We do not knowhow muchit will
cost in policy wrecked or analysis misapplied or reputation ruined if
purchasing-power parity is said to be true when by the measure of the
slope coefficient it is only 85-percent true. That is, the argument (due to
Neyman and Pearson 1933) that undergirds modern econometrics has
been set aside here as elsewhere in favor ofa merely statistical standard,
and an irrelevant one related to sampling error at that. We are told how
improbable it is that a slope coefficient of .90 came from a distribution
centeredon 1.00in view ofthe one kind oferrorwe claim we know about
(unbiased sampling error, with finite variance), but we are not told135 The Success of Purchasing-Power Parity
whether it matters to the truth of purchasing-power parity where such
limits of confidence are placed.
Silence on the matter is not confined to the literature of purchasing-
power parity. Most texts on econometrics do not mention that the good-
ness or badness of a hypothesis is not ascertainable on merely statistical
grounds. Statisticians themselves are more self-conscious, although the
transition from principle to practice is sometimes awkward. A practical
difficulty in the way of using the Neyman and Pearson theory in pure
form, say Mood and Graybill (1963, p. 278), is that
the loss function is not known at all or else it is not known accurately
enough to warrant its use. If the loss function is not known, it seems
that a decision function that in some sense minimizes the error proba-
bilities will be a reasonable procedure.
Such a procedure might be reasonable for a general statistician who
makes no claim to know what is a good or bad approximation to truth in
fields outside statistics itself. The procedure is not reasonable for a
specialist in international trade ormacroeconomics. Ifthe loss function is
not known it should be discovered.
Findingtheloss function amounts to finding outhowclose theslopehas
to be to 1.00in orderfor it to be reckoned close enough. Everystudentof
the matter is more or less aware of the need for some standard against
which to judge the closeness, a standard beyond the probability ofbeing
misled by sampling errors (if there really are any) into gullibility or
skeptjcism, but no one has provided them. In a superb paper that has by
its sheer weight and subtlety turned the tide of battle recently against
purchasing-power parity, for example, Kravis and Lipsey (1978), in
reporting some calculations of parity relative to base years and some
correlation coefficients (both of which "ought" to be 1.00), remark:
Each analyst will have to decide in the light of his own purposes
whether the PPP relationships fall close enough to 1.00 to satisfy the
theories. As a matterofgeneral judgment, we express ouropinion that
the results do not support the notion of a tightly integrated interna-
tional price structure. (Pp. 214ff.)
Theonly guidance theyprovide to evaluating their "generaljudgment" is
a footnote (p. 214) reporting that in the general judgment of Hout-
hakker, Haberler, and Johnson deviations from parity ofanything under
10 or 20 percent are acceptable to the hypothesis.
ll It happens, inciden-
tally, that the bulk ofthe Kravis and Lipsey evidence passes rather than
fails such a test. But accepting or rejecting one unargued standard of
truth by comparing it with another unargued standard of truth does not
advance the art of argument in economics very much.136 Donald N. McCloskey and J. Richard Zecher
To be fair, Kravis and Lipsey are in fact unusually sensitive to the case
for having some standard, more sensitive than are economists working
the field with more powerful statistical tools. So frequently does their
paper make the point that it must be accounted one of the major ones
made. Repeatedly, for instance, they draw a distinction between the
statistical and the economic significance of their results: "Indeed, even
high coefficients of correlation [between domestic and foreign prices]
may conceal shifts in relationships that are economically important"
(p. 204); "The difference [of slope coefficients from 1.00] may not be
large enough to be picked up by a statistical test yet be economically
significant" (p. 236); "even a high correlation does not preclude what
may be economically significant variations between the two indexes"
(p. 242); and so forth, passim. The intellectual sword is sharp.
Remarkably, however, they use thesword only against, notin favor of,
purchasing-power parity, and never turn it on themselves. After stating
repeatedly that they do 'not have a standard by which to judge the
hypothesis, they nonetheless conclude:
We think it unlikely that the high degree ofnational and international
commodity abitrage thatmany versions ofthe monetarist theoryofthe
balanceofpaymentscontemplateis typicalofthe realworld. Thisis not
to deny that the price structures of the advanced industrial countries
are linked together, but it is to suggest that the links are loose rather
than rigid. (Italics added; p. 243.)
Every italicized word involves a comparison against some standard of
what constitutes likelihood orhighness ortypicality orlinkage orrigidity,
yet no standard is proposed. Indeed, the lone page (p. 204) in their fifty
that addresses the issue, entitled "Criterion ofSimilarity ofPrice Move-
ments," is devotedto dismissing the lone attemptin theliteraturetooffer
a criterion (namely, the Genberg-Zecher criterion: if the correlations of
prices among different countries are as good orbad as they are inside one
country, then the different countries act as one) and to remarking again
that the merely statistical standard used elsewhere in the paper is in fact
irrelevant.
Theirrelevance ofthe merelystatisticalstandardoffit does not bedevil
only that half of the empirical literature that finds purchasing-power
parityto bewrong. Towardstheendofafine articlefavorable to purchas-
ing-power parity, Krugman writes (1978 p. 405):
There are several ways in which we might try to evaluate PPP as a
theory. We can ask how much itexplains [thatis, R-square]; we can ask
how large the deviations from PPP are in some absolute sense; and we
can ask whetherthe deviations from PPPare in some sense systematic.
The defensive usage "in some absolute sense" and "in some sense"
betrayshis unease, which is fully justified. Thereis no "absolutesense"in137 The Success of Purchasing-Power Parity
which a description is good or bad. The sense must be comparative to a
standard.
Similarly, Jacob Frenkel (1978 p. 175) says "if the market is efficient
andiftheforward exchange rate is an unbiasedforecast ofthefuture spot
exchange rate, the constantterm [in a regression ofthespot ratetodayon
the future rate for today quoted yesterday] ... should not differ signifi-
cantly from zero, the slope coefficient should not differsignificantly from
unity" (italics added). In a footnote on the next page, speaking of the
standard errors of the estimates for such an equation in the 1920s,
Frenkel argues that "while these results indicate that markets were
efficient and that on average forward rates were unbiased forecasts of
future spotrates, the2-8percenterrorsweresignificant" (italics added).12
What he appears to mean is that he judges a 2- to 8-percent error to be
large in some economic sense. In any event, what his results imply about
theirsubjectis unclear-purchasing-powerparity, becausesignificancein
statistics, however useful it is as an input into economic significance, is
not the same thing as economic significance.
2.5 The Search for Standards
Results typical oftheconventionaltests ofpurchasing-powerparityare
easy to replicate. Regressions for 1880 to 1940 (running through the First
World War, as a more extreme test of the argument) of the U.S. GNP
deflator (to avoid the usual criticism of the domination of wholesale
prices by traded goods) against Canadian or U.K. prices adjusted by
official exchange rates are (all variablesin logarithms andstandarderrors
in parentheses):
Price in U.S. = 0.83 + 0.87 [Exchange-adjUsted]
(0.19) (0.04) Canadian price .
R
2 = .87,D.W. = 0.29
Price in U.S. = 0.26 + 0.93 [Exchange-adjUsted]
(0.14) (0.03) U.K. price .
R
2 = .94,D.W. = 0.46
Additional regressions adjusting for autocorrelation and for the simul-
taneity of prices and exchange rates (during the floating-rate period)
yielded ~'s for the United Kingdom that ranged from .91 to 1.02, and for
Canada from .35 to 1.00. Most ofthese regressions have in common the
result that at conventional levels of significance, the slope coefficients
would be said to be different from 1.00, and about half of the trends
would exhibit "drift." In other words, by the usual standards, these
regression results would lead to the conclusion that purchasing-power
parity "fails."
But the regressions also have something else in common-auniformly138 Donald N. McCloskey and J. Richard Zecher
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"high" correlation as measured by R 2. Consider the plots in figures 2.1
and 2.2 ofthe actual U.S. price, the price estimated from foreign prices,
and their difference, for Canada and the United Kingdom. Although the
period includes the Great War and the Great Depression, the foreign
prices do predict the gross outlines of the U.S. price. Such eyeballing is
another way of saying that the RZ's are high, as they are. A fuller
treatment would make the sensitivity analysis explicit, introducing the
cost of being wrong in adopting a model in which a was zero and f3 was
1.00.
A second standard is suggested by the bottom graphs, which plot the
forecasting errorin unitsofstandarddeviation. Theperiod1880-1914is a
standard for relative tranquility. This is the standard, a relative one overtime. Ifone is willing to think of 1880-1914 as tranquil (one may not, of
course), then it lends meaning to the "success" or "failure" of purchas-
ing-power parity. Comparing 1880-1914 with 1921-40 reveals no differ-
ence in the average deviation from purchasing-power parity. The com-
parison involving the United Kingdom, indeed, can even include the
Great War and its immediate aftermath with no change in result. The
turbulence of the 1920s and 1930s, which is said to have loosened the
economic ties among nations, appears not to have done so. The price
relations are equally close, which suggests that the economic behavior
causing prices to move in parallel was uniform. It is no surprise that
turbulencewould offerhigh rewards to arbitrageurs andthatarbitrageurs
would take them.140 Donald N. McCloskey and J. Richard Zecher
A third standard (our favorite) is the Genberg-Zecher criterion (see
section 2.4 above). Our paper, and papers by Genberg (1976, 1978),
expanded on this theme in the early 1970s.
13 It will suffice for the present
to recall the conclusion of our work, namely, that the matrix of the
UnitedStates, the UnitedKingdom, Germany, andSweden (with special
attention to the United Kingdom) had correlations of prices in the
1880-1914 period similar to those between different parts ofthe United
States. Genberg performed similar tests with similar results for recent
times. The few attempts since to undermine the conclusion leave us
unmoved. Arthur Gandolfi and James Lothian (1982) have written an
interesting paper on the subject, but demand that the hypothesis pass a
test ofa lower correlation between very close states ofthe United States
than between far nations of the world.
A common reaction to the standard is, "Well, suppose we do not even
accept the premise that the United States is a unified market?" If one
does not accept such a premise, then of course one will refrain from
speakingof"the" U.S. price level. Norwill onetalk of"the" U.S. GNP.
If the United States itself is a mere collection of wholly local markets,
there is no more use for the talk than for talk about macroeconomic
variables for a federation of Fiji-Botswana-Iceland-Saskatchewan, that
is, for a random assortment of places.
Fourth and finally, purchasing-power parity can be tested against the
standard of explaining major events or illuminating puzzles in history.
We have mentioned the event of the United States returning to gold in
1879 at the wrong parity. Consider another episode, puzzling to all who
have noticedit, theinflationof1933-34. Itwas aspectacularoutlierofthe
Phillips curve, an example of stagflation forty years before that hideous
neologism was coined. Unemployment was very high, yet prices rose,
whatever notion of "the" price level one uses: a 14 percent rise in
wholesale priceswould have causedalarmevenin 1981; a3percentrise in
consumer (retail) prices would have caused alarm at least in 1960 (table
2.1). Why did it happen?
While recognizing the indirect force ofthe world price level, Friedman
and Schwartz (1963, pp. 498-99), argued that:
Another [factor] was almost surely the explicit measures to raise prices
and wages undertaken with government encouragement and assist-
ance, notably, NIRA[theNationalIndustrialRecoveryAct, leadingto
the National Recovery Administration, or NRA], the Guffey Coal
Act, the agricultural price-support program, and the National Labor
Relations Act. ... We have grave doubts that autonomous changes in
wages and prices played an important role [after World War II. But]
there seems to us a much stronger case for a wage-price or price-wage
spiral interpretation of 1933-37.
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Table 2.1 U.8. Price Indexes 1932-36 (1933 = 100)
Definition
of Prices 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936
1. GNP deflator,
1929 weights 113 101 100 106 105 109
2. GNP deflator,
1954 weights 113 102 100 106 107 108
3. Personal consump-
tion, 1954 weights 117 104 100 106 108 109
4. Consumer price
index 118 106 100 103 106 107
5. Retail food 124 103 100 112 119 120
6. Wholesale prices,




all industries 122 107 100 104 108 113
Source: U.S. Bureauofthe Census 1960. Row 1, seriesF 1/2; row2,F67,87; row3, F68,88;
row 4, E 113; row 5, E 114; row 6, E 13; row 7, D 696.
This is an unusual line ofreasoning for such crusaders against mixing up
the determination of relative and absolute prices. It also seems to us to
square poorly with the evidence.
The chief factual difficulties with the notion that the official cartels
sanctioned by the NRA codes caused a rise in the general price level is
that most of the NRA codes were not enacted until after the price rise.
Ante hoc ergo non propter hoc. Look at the plot of wholesale prices of
1933 in figure 2.3 (retail prices, including such nontradables as housing,
show a similar pattern). Most ofthe rise occurs in May, June, andJuly of
1933, but the NIRA was not even passed until June. A law passed,
furthermore, is not a law enforced. However eager most businessmen
must have been to cooperate with a government intent on forming
monopolies, the formation took time. As the Bureau ofLabor Statistics
described it:
Themonthlyloadofcodeapprovalsreachedits peakin theperiodfrom
October 1933 to March 1934; thereafter there was a rapid decrease.
Many ofthe large employing industries were codified in the latter part
of1933 [mentioningcotton textiles, petroleum, bituminous coal, retail
trade, fabricated metal products, retail food]. The National Recovery
Administration estimated in a report issued in February 1934 that
codificationofAmericanindustryunderthe industrialself-government


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.143 The Success of Purchasing-Power Parity
By September 1933, apparently before the approval of most NRA
codes-and, judging from the late coming of compulsion, before the
effective approval of agricultural codes-three-quarters of the total rise
in wholesale prices and more of the total rise in retail food prices from
March 1933 to the average of 1934 was complete. On the face of it, at
least, the NRA is a poor candidate for a cause of the price rise. It came
too late.
What came in time was the depreciation of the dollar, a conscious
policy ofthe Roosevelt administration from the beginning, although not
usually believed to have taken effect until the fall of 1933. There was
certainly no contemporaneousprice rise abroadto explain the 28-percent
rise in American wholesale prices (and in retail food prices) between
April 1933 and the high point in September 1934. In fact, in twenty-five
countries the average rise was only 2.2 percent, with the American rise
far and away the largest. The close link between exchange rates and U.S.
wholesale prices is clear in the weekly series graphed in figure 2.3 above.
Note especially the two sharp jumps around 20 April and 2 July in
response to explicit announcements by Roosevelt of the intent of his
administration to devalue the dollar. Wholesale prices move up simul-
taneously.
It would appear, in short, that the economic history of1933 cannot be
understood with a model closed to direct arbitrage. The inflation was no
gradual working out of price-specie flow; less was it an inflation of
aggregate demand. It happened quickly, well before most other New
Deal policies (and in particular the NRA) could take effect, and it
happened about when and to the extent that the dollar was devalued. By
the standard of success in explaining major events, parity here works.
2.6 Purchasing-Power Parity and Monetary Policy
In the style ofthe doubts expressed above aboutprice-specieflow, the
success of parity can be judged by the failure of the alternatives. A
commonview in much ofpurchasing-power-parityliterature is thatwhile
international trade places limits on what exchange-adjusted domestic
prices can be, there is nevertheless considerable flexibility for prices to
move up and down. It is argued in particular that a country can raise its
price level relative to the exchange-adjusted price abroad by expanding
the domesticmoneysupply. Ifthe activities oftradersandarbitrageurs fix
priceswithinvery narrow ranges, however, such policieswould notwork.
Consider, then, the relationship between monetary policy and the "er-
rors" in purchasing-power-parity forecasts.
The model is monetarist, postulating that excessively rapid money
growthwill putupward pressureonprices, leadingto domesticpricesthat
are systematicallyoverthe purchasing-power-paritypredictions. This is a144 Donald N. McCloskey and J. Richard Zecher
test, then, to what degree a country, the United States in this case, can
through its monetary policies affect its price level (Pus) relative to prices
(adjusted for exchange rates) in the rest of the world (Pus).
In general equilibrium terms, the hypothesis concerns a state of dis-
equilibrium in the goods markets that is matched by an offsetting dis-
equilibrium in the domestic money market. The regression model below
represents the goods-markets disequilibrium by the difference between
actual U.S. prices and the purchasing-power-parity prediction of U.S.
prices using Canadian and U.K. prices and exchange rates.
Disequilibrium in the U.S. money market is the difference between
growth in money supply a (MS ) and money demand a (M
D
). Two
measures of money supply are used: (1) M2, which reflects the Martian
view that the United States could control its total money supply over the
1880-1940 period, and (2) domestic credit, omitting the effects ofspecie
flows onmoneysupply, which reflects theview thatformostofthis period
the United States could only affect domestic credit, not total money
supply.
Growth in money demand is represented by the sum ofgrowth in real
income and in prices, on the assumptions that money demand is unit
elastic with respect to both ofthese variables: i.e., a MD = a y + a P,
where y is real income and P is the price level. Thus the regression
equation becomes:




The regression results are reported in tables 2.2 and 2.3. Of the
thirty-six estimated coefficients relating excess money growth to changes
in the purchasing-power-parity forecast error, twenty-two are negative
and sixteen are positive. Two ofthese coefficients are significant at the 5
percent level; both are negative and both are for regressions using M2 as
the measure ofmoney. Only two ofthe twenty-four regressions have R2s
above .08. There is little support here for the notion that the errors in
purchasing-power parity are related to domestic monetary conditions.
The alternative to the international determination of prices appears to
work poorly.
2.7 Conclusion
The argument andevidence presentedhere make a pronouncement of
the failure of purchasing-power parity impossible, and without a pro-
nouncement of failure much of modern macroeconomics is badly dam-
aged. The failure of purchasing-power parity must be large indeed to
leave the Martian models and thei'r empirical implementations un-
scathed, whether these are Keynesian, monetarist, orrationally expecta-145 The Success of Purchasing-Power Parity
tionist. Under either the cleanly fixed exchange rates that typify the
historical periods used to test the models or under the dirty float that
typifies the years in which the conclusions thus tested have been used for
policy, it is hard to believe that foreign prices or interest rates did not
matter. Yetthe silence ofmost American macroeconomistsonthe role of
Table 2.2 Purchasing-Power-Parity Forecast Errors For the U.S. as a




Errors Constant Growth Growth R
2 D.W.
Implicit Deflator
Canadian 0.018 0.109 0.007 1.905
(0.038) (0.166)
0.019 0.125 0.163 0.023 1.893
(0.037) (0.166) (0.166)
U.K. 0.087 0.040 0.000 2.160
(0.098) (0.429)
-0.089 -0.080 0.417 0.016 2.108
(0.098) (0.431) (0.431)
CPI
Canadian 0.026 0.077 0.001 2.208
(0.060) (0.263)
0.028 0.112 0.360 0.033 2.327
(0.060) (0.262) (0.262)
U.K. -0.117 0.154 0.001 2.481
(0.117) (0.512)
-0.117 -0.167 0.132 0.003 2.484
(0.118) (0.519) (0.519)
WPI
Canadian 0.489 -1.114 0.106 1.609
(0.096) (0.421)
-0.488 -1.126 -0.123 0.107 1.621
(0.097) (0.427) (0.427)
U.K. -0.404 -0.343 0.005 2.100
(0.139) (0.610)
-0.402 -0.304 -0.406 0.013 2.124
(0.140) (0.615) (0.615)
Sources: Canada: Deflator, Firestone 1958; CPI, Urquhart and Buckley 1965, tables J165,
139; WPI, ibid., table J34. U.K.: Deflator, Feinstein 1971; CPI, McCloskey and Zecher
1976; Mitchell 1975,series 12; WPI, Mitchell 1975 series 11; BoardofTradeseriesspliced at
1919-20and 1929-30. U.S.: Deflator, U.S. Bureauofthe Census 1975, seriesF5; CPI, ibid.,
series E 135; WPI, ibid., series E 23; money supply and gold flows, Friedman and Schwartz
1963, pp. 704-7; real GNP, McCloskey and Zecher 1976; U.S. Bureau ofthe Census 1975,
series F 3.
Note: Values in parentheses are the standard errors of the coefficients.146 Donald N. McCloskey and J. Richard Zecher
Table 2.3 Purchasing-Power-Parity Forecast Errors For the U.S. as a





Errors Constant Growth Growth R
2 D.W.
Implicit Deflator
Canadian 0.004 -0.002 0.001 1.719
(1.175) (0.010)
-0.410 -0.004 0.144 0.026 1.726
(1.223) (0.010) (0.124)
U.K. -0.674 -0.008 0.015 2.564
(1.069) (0.009)
-1.014 -0.010 0.119 0.035 2.632
(1.116) (0.009) (0.113)
CPI
Canadian 0.146 -0.003 0.003 1.912
(0.756) (0.006)
0.012 -0.003 0.047 0.010 1.926
(0.795) (0.006) (0.080)
U.K. -0.094 -0.010 0.016 1.694
(1.270) (0.010)
-0.233 -0.010 0.048 0.019 1.726
(1.338) (0.011) (0.135)
WPI
Canadian -0.405 -0.006 0.023 2.307
(0.609) (0.005)
-0.088 -0.004 -0.110 -0.076 2.246
(0.264) (0.005) (0.063)
U.K. -0.012 -0.008 0.026 1.937
(0.835) (0.007)
0.098 -0.008 -0.038 0.029 1.898
(0.880) (0.007) (0.089)
Sources: See table 2.2.
Note: Values in parentheses are the standard errors of the coefficients.
the rest of the world in their models implies such a belief. It is hard to
believe that American prices and interest rates are not at all constrained
directly by the forces of arbitrage. Yet the journals are filled with work
embodying this belief. The failure of arbitrage necessary to validate a
Martian model must be gross, not a matter ofthe fourth digit ofaccuracy
but ofthe first. To the first digit ofaccuracy, and even to the second, the
hypothesis ofparity succeeds. One wonders what would happen to esti-
mates ofwage andpriceequations, oroftheeffectsofdomesticmonetary
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rational expectations, if they were each asked to embody the interna-
tional milieu of the U.S. economy to the second digit of accuracy.
The hypothesis of parity survives the test for the reasons usual in
economic arguments. Economists are embarrassed to assert in print that
they possess the economic equivalent of a perpetual-motion machine,
and the gross violations of rationality that opponents of purchasing-
powerparitybelieve they see entail such a machine. General equilibrium
makes the hypothesis still more robust; even nontradedgoods are substi-
tutes in consumption and production with traded goods; a few character-
istics are tradable in markets even when named goods are not; and the
tendencyfor parityto holdin thelong rungives opportunitiesfor specula-
tive profits if it does not hold in the short.
The standards by which parity "fails" empirically are unclear, as many
opponents of the hypothesis readily admit. The literature contains no
articulation ofstandards. The introduction ofstandards casts into doubt
all the recent attacks onparity. By standards thatmake intellectual sense
the hypothesis succeeds. It succeeds in explaining the U.S. price level
from 1880 to 1940 to a standard of accuracy demanded of such
explanations.
16 It succeeds in explaining the price level in turbulent
periods by the standard oftranquil periods. It succeeds in explaining the
difference in prices among countries by the standard ofthe difference in
prices among places in a single country. One of its competitors, closed-
economy monetarism, fails to explain the residual deviations from parity
by the standard ofstatistical fit. Anotherofits competitors, the elasticity
approach, fails to explain the balance of trade by the same standard,
although again we express our doubt that much can be inferred from the
uncontrolled experiments in curve fitting that characterize the literature
and that we have dutifully followed here. And by the standard of good
storytelling that underlies all economics, applied to episodes from their
beginning to their end, the hypothesis of parity explains what happened
underthe gold standard. Purchasing-powerparity is not a failure. On the
contrary, by the standardswe have examined, it is a great success. And at
the least, speaking to the most skeptical reader, it is not so great a failure
that macroeconomics can go on ignoring the rest of the world.
Notes
1. See R. Dornbusch and D. Jaffee's (1978) introduction to the special issue of the
Journal of International Economics on purchasing-power parity. They remark that the
Kravis and Lipsey paperin the issue leaves purchasing-power parity "ratherin a shambles"
(p. 159).
2. Samuelson, the chieftheoretician ofthe real theory, however, is an implacable foe of
purchasing-power parity.148 Donald N. McCloskey and J. Richard Zecher
3. Gottfried Haberleronce described Cassel'swork as "onepartWicksell and nine parts
water." One can also read the General Theory as taking prices to be given (not constant),
because given by international factors such as purchasing-power parity.
4. Friedman and Schwartz (1982, p. 318) assume no quick operation of price-specie
flow. Were it as quick as in the monetary approach, many oftheir otherconclusions would
be wrong, especially the effect of domestic money on prices.
5. Prices might have risen in anticipation of gold flows, though such rationality runs
counter to the usual price-specie-flow argument.
6. See Darby 1982. Kravis and Lipsey (1978) make a similarpoint, arguing that the drift
of purchasing power from parity over periods of a decade or so shows that parity is false.
7. Roll says further that "In an efficient market, something so easy to detect and so
intoxicating to the arbitrager as a relative price difference in two locations would presum-
ably display an immeasurably short half-life" (p. 136).
8. Oneofus (McCloskey 1981, chaps. 4, 6) has in fact done similar work with the notion
thatEnglish businessmen failed to adopt profitable novelties in the late nineteenthcentury.
The task is to see whether the second-guesser could have done better, recognizing the
limitations of resources they faced (including a limitation on prescience). It is worth
knowing for the present context that the second-guessing showed that the businessmen
knew what they were doing.
9. The source for the trade statistics is U.S. Bureau of the Census 1960 based on
declarations to American customs. The period covered is 1880-1940.
10. A good-or bad---example is the paper by J. D. Richardson (1978). Richardson
regresses Canadian on U.S. prices (multiplied by the exchange rate) for a number of
industries and concludes: "it is notable that the 'law of one price' fails uniformly. The
hypothesis ofperfect commodity arbitrage is rejected with 95 percent confidence for every
commodity group" (p. 347).
11. To which may be added an authority overlooked by Kravis and Lipsey, Leland B.
Yeager(1958). Yeagerreckonedthatiftwenty-six outofthirty-five countrieswere within 25
percent of their 1937 parity by 1957, the hypothesis is confirmed.
Richard Caves and Ronald Jones (1973) may be added to the affirmation. They remark
on Yeager's results that "this performance seems rather good-just how good it is hard to
say" (p. 338). The rueful remark, "justhow good is hardto say," illustrateswell how urgent
it is to develop some standard. The state of play, largely favorable to purchasing-power
parity, is well described in a comprehensive review by Lawrence H. Officer (1976).
12. In another article, Frenkel (1981), concludes that the "collapse" ofPPP during the
1970s was due to a fundamental difference between exchange rates and prices. "Exchange
rates reflect expectations about future circumstances while prices reflect more present and
past circumstances" (p. 162). In this view, arbitrageurs in commodity markets look back-
wardsin time while arbitrageursin financial marketslookforwards. Foradifferentview, see
Nattress and Zecher 1982, where a theory of the arbitrageur is developed.
13. Genbergwrites (1976, p. 302): "itis evident... that the differences between OECD
countries are no greater on the average than those between cities within the United States.
Thus, if we believe that the whole of the U.S. can be treated as a single market in a
macroeconomic context, then the area composed of the above countries can be treated
likewise."
14. Friedman and Schwartz speak of 1933-37 because of their commitment to analysis
by cycles, 1933-37 being an upswing. Notice that by all measures exceptthe consumerprice
index most ofthe price rise hadoccurredbefore 1935. Thediscussion ofindirectinfluence of
devaluation occurs at any rate on pp. 465ff, at the beginning ofwhich a direct influence on
"most farm products and raw materials exported by the United States" is mentioned.
15. BLS Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1937, pp. 512ff. The report referred to was
"Report on the Operations of the National Recovery Act," p. 7.
16. Another related standard that we shall explore in later work is that of the relative149 The Success of Purchasing-Power Parity
convergenceofprices overtime. Spooner'smagnificent graphs (BraudelandSpooner1967,
pp. 470-71) show ranges ofwheat prices expressed in silver in Europe and its offshoots of
6.66 to 1 around 1400, falling steadily to 1.88 to 1 around 1750. The divergences ofthe late
nineteenth century, not to speak of the twentieth, look trivial beside these. Correspond-
ingly, fixation on the "failure" ofthe unityofworld markets for the period 1880-1939looks
odd indeed.
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Comment Robert E. Lipsey
How to define purchasing-power parity and how to test its "success" is
the central issue ofMcCloskey and Zecher's paper. The authors come to
two conclusions about purchasing-power parity, both favorable. One
conclusion is derived from their reasoning and one from their tests. The
first conclusion is that purchasing-power parity works instantaneously
and perfectly, immediately eliminating any genuine differences in prices
ordivergences in relative price movements. Thesecond is thatthe theory
works sufficiently well that foreign influences on prices cannot be
ignored. I shall argue that the first conclusion, as stated, depends on a
definition of purchasing-power parity that makes it a tautology, not
susceptible to proofor disproof, and that the second conclusion is valid
butwould not be disputed by many "critics" ofthe theory. I shall arguein
addition that the strongest test they propose has been performed, with
results that are unfavorable to the theory by their own criterion.
The Definition of Purchasing-Power Parity
Indiscussing the meaningofthe concept, the authorssaythattheyview
purchasing-power parity as resulting from arbitrage in commodity mar-
kets. Tome thatmeansthey identifytheconceptwith theoperationofthe
law of one price rather than with vaguer notions of aggregate country
price levels orprice changes. Forexample, "purchasing-powerparityis a
consequence of rationality in arbitraging. If all the opportunities for
riskless (or insured) arbitrage among countries that are profitable at
existing interest rates and other costs ofarbitrage have taken place, then
the price level of the world may be said to have exhausted its ability to
determine the price level ofone country" (p. 127), and "Ifopportunities
for arbitrage are exploited (allowing fully for the cost of transport and
information), then the price level ofonecountryis fixed by the rest ofthe
world, even in the very short run" (p. 129).
Two things can be said about this definition or "theorem" or "higher-
orderproposition" as the authors refer to the latterversion. Oneis thatit
is not what most people mean by purchasing-power parity. A second is
that, stated this way, it is only a definition, not a theory, and is not
susceptible to testing. The authors make no effort to apply it empirically.
If one includes and takes seriously all the qualifying phrases about costs
of arbitrage over space and time, most of which are not measured and
probably cannot be measured, it is impossible to show that purchasing-
power parity has been violated. The price ofproduct x in country a plus
allcosts ofarbitrage (including information costs, advantages ofcontinu-
ity ofsupplierrelationships, costsofadaptationofexistingmachineryand
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work habits, etc.) equals the price of product x in country b. That
statementis an identity; ittells us nothing abouthow theworldworks. By
this standard, prices on Mars and Venus satisfy purchasing-power parity
even though there is no communication between them. The information
and arbitrage costs are so high that any prices orprice changes satisfy the
authors' criterion: no one can make money by arbitrage between the two
planets.
Critics of purchasing-power parity do not deny this tautology. What
they argue is that adjustment costs are large in some cases, that it may
take a long time to overcome them, that prices can move relative to each
other in the meantime, and that consumers and producers react to these
price differences and relative price movements.
The authors illustrate their point about arbitrage with examples of
changing price differences for electrical equipment, cement, andvacuum
cleaners. It is clearfrom these examples that they picture the mechanism
often called the law of one price, referring to prices of individual com-
modities, as enfor.cing purchasing-power parity. They do not give vivid
examples of arbitrageurs buying the U.S. CPI or WPI or GNP deflator
and selling that of the U.K. Of course, if the law of one price operated
exactly and instantaneously, that is, if prices ofcarefully defined individ-
ual products were identical everywhere or moved identically in different
countries, the levels of prices in general and their movements would be
similar or would move similarly. However, aggregate price levels and
price changes would not be the same. Given the differences among
countries in the composition of consumption and production and what
are probably even greater differences in the way that aggregate price
measures are constructed, one must be careful in moving from one kind
of statement to the other. The authors take little note of this point and
speak aboutthe movements ofvaguely defined and badly measured price
aggregatesin differentcountries and the responses to themas iftheywere
usefulfor testingtheopportunitiesfor, orexistence of, arbitrage. I do not
think they are.
Testing Purchasing-Power Parity
The first test the authors propose is that a critic of purchasing-power
parity show that he has gotten rich on arbitrage profits. "It surpasses
belief that many opportunities to make easy money buying low and
selling high persist long enough to be observed in economic data" (p.
128). "Often unrecognized by critics of purchasing-power parity is that
their conclusion that it has failed usually implies an ability to make
money. Anyonewho knewthatpurchasing-powerparitywas truein some
long run butnot yet truein thepresentwould have a rosy financial future.
The divergences from purchasing-power parity detected in the literature
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to collect thattheopportunitiesfor profit are large. Gothee andprosper"
(p. 131). "Economistsare embarrassedto assert in printthattheypossess
the economic equivalent of a perpetual-motion machine, and the gross
violations of rationality that opponents of purchasing-power parity be-
lieve they see entail such a machine" (p; 147).
The number of times the point appears shows that the authors take it
seriously, but I have never seen a criticism of purchasing-power parity
that implied irrationality on the part of purchasers. There is strong
evidence thatin the capital goods andothercomplexproductsthatform a
large part of the trade of developed countries, price differences and
divergences in price movements exist. They are not arbitraged away
immediately, but they do eventually bring about shifts in trade that tend
to remove them (an indication that they are not simply illusory or due to
differences in specifications). The reasons are implicit in some of the
authors' own discussion: information is costly and the risks ofpurchasing
unknown types of machinery and dealing with unfamiliar suppliers are
high and uninsurable.
A fall in the price ofa Japanese machine might at first produce no shift
in purchases because buyers were unaware of the change, uncertain
aboutits permanence, orskeptical aboutthe qualityofthe machineorthe
availability ofspare parts. There would be no violation ofthe law ofone
price by the authors' definition, because the price difference was insuf-
ficient to offset information or risk or insurance costs. After the lower
price had been in effect for a year, information would become more
widely and cheaply available, risk and insurance costs would decrease,
and some buyers would switch. After another year more information
would be available and still more buyers would switch. Ateachpoint, the
price in Japan plus information, risk, and insurance would have been
equalto theprice in the UnitedStates. Thereforethis sequenceofevents,
which would suggest a violation ofthe law ofoneprice to most observers,
would be in conformity with it by the authors' definition.
In view ofthe impracticality ofcalculating in retrospect allthe costs of
arbitrage, the authorsgo onto suggest a "morepractical" test. Thattest is
"whether the shipments ofgoods implied by the supposed opportunities
for arbitrage in fact occurred.... A country that exhibits divergences
from purchasing-power parity convincing to the doubters should also
exhibitlowerexportsandincreasedimports ...aplacewith 'high' prices
would have a hard time selling and an easy time buying" (p. 131).
Onemight expectthatthe authorswould performtheir "practical" test
on the data for commodities defined as narrowly as possible to observe
the action orinaction ofarbitrageurs. Instead, they perform their tests of
responses to deviations from purchasing-power parity between the
United States and the United Kingdom and the United States and Can-
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seekingby arbitrageurs is theforce at work, andtheywish toobserve that
action, why measure purchasing-power parity from price aggregates?
The arbitrageurcannoteasily buytheV.S. wholesale price indexorGNP
deflator. A more appropriate test of the workings of arbitrage, and one
the authors themselves suggest, would be to compare price and trade
changes for identical or related goods such as the electrical equipment
they refer to. As they say, "Furthertests ofthe hypothesis that profitable
opportunities for arbitrage arise when measured prices diverge might
proceed commodity by commodity."
In fact, Irving Kravis and I, using price indexes that were constructed
so that the same goods with the same weights were represented in two
countries' price measures did perform many versions of the "practical"
test they suggest, although not with the intention of testing purchasing-
power parity. That is, we investigated whether price changes and differ-
ences in price levels did lead to shifts in trade. We found strong evidence
thattheydid andthattheseshifts took years beforethey were completed.
Weexplained the reasons for these lags in ourbookonprice competitive-
ness (Kravis and Lipsey 1971) and in a series of later articles.
l
The reasons we gave for the price and price-change divergences we
found did not imply that there were overlookedopportunities for above-
average profit, given the costs of information, costs of adjustment, and
uncertainties about the permanenceofprice changes. Itwas true that the
first V.S. buyers of foreign electrical generating equipment and foreign
steel paid less than their competitors who hesitated. We cannot say what
the rational policy was for a buyer of generating equipment given the
possible uncertainties at the time. The first buyers were public systems
which may have faced less danger from mistakes than private utilities.
Theprivate utilities may have hadlittle incentive to lowercosts, given the
way theirprices were regulated andthe lackofincentives for managers to
break cozy relationships with domestic suppliers. The important point is
that whatever the reason, gaps in prices persisted for a long time and
produced notsudden butgradual shifts in trade; butthey did produce the
shifts that McCloskey and Zecher imply would refute purchasing-power
parity.
In looking back at these past episodes in which price differences
gradually gave rise to shifts in trade, we do not know whether the first
V.S. buyers offoreign electrical generators and transformers or the first
V.S. buyers offoreign steel reaped exceptional profits for a time. Even if
they did, the profits, as usually measured, may have done no more than
compensate for the risks, given the uncertainties about the quality of
foreign products, the reaction of the V.S. government and regulatory
agencies, the commitment of foreign suppliers to technical assistance,
service, and continuity of supply, and many other factors. Thus these
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definition (it would be difficult to do that), but fail their test ofconform-
ance with the theory by the "practical" test.
If, as stated in the text (p. 127), the hypothesis has to do with the
rationalityofarbitrageurs, the tests theyofferare irrelevant. I knowofno
writer skeptical ofpurchasing-power parity who has stated or implied or
assumed that the reason for deviations from it is thattraders ignore profit
opportunities. They believe there have been deviationsfrom purchasing-
power parity because it was not profitable to exploit all opportunities or
to exploit them immediately, given the costs and uncertainties involved.
One does not add to understanding of the international economy by
assuming away all these deviations from purchasing-power parity.
The paperincludes several ofthe authors' own tests, butthese are tests
ofwhatI called atthe beginningofmy comments theirsecondconclusion,
orthe second version ofpurchasing-power parity. Thatsecond, orweak,
version is that "it is hard to believe that foreign prices . . . did not
matter" or"thatAmerican prices are not at all constraineddirectlyby the
forces of arbitrage" (p. 146). They test this version by regressions ofthe
U.S. GNP deflator against aggregate Canadian and British price indexes
adjusted by exchange rates, and by plots of the U.S. price indexes
predicted by Canadian and British prices and of the prediction errors
from the equations. Thecorrelations are "high,"theyconclude, and"the
foreign prices do predict the gross outlines of the American price."
Furthermore, they report, the equations predict as well in the turbulent
period 1921-40 as in the "tranquil" period 1880-1914. Aside from the
point that these equations represent the "uncontrolled experiments in
curve fitting" the authors are so critical of in others, the equations are
unconvincing in otherways. Forexample, for the first twenty years ofthe
chart the Canadian price predicts nothing ofU.S. price movements. We
are then told that foreign prices did no worse as predictors ofU.S. prices
in turbulent times than in "tranquil" times. Butfor halfofthe "tranquil"
period foreign price did not predict at all-not a very exacting standard
for judging the predictive powerofCanada'sprices to estimate laterU.S.
prices. A more serious objection to these tests is that there is no consid-
eration of the possibility that the high correlation stemmed from the
effects of common factors, such as World War I and the Great Depres-
sion on U.S., Canadian, and British prices at the same time, rather than
from the dependence of one country's prices on another's.
Judging the Results of Tests of Purchasing-Power Parity
A substantial part of the paper is devoted to standards by which to
judge the results of tests of purchasing-power parity. The authors take
many oftheircolleagues to taskfor using vague andill-defined standards.
I cannot see that they escape the same problem. Theirpaperis filled with
the same undefined terms they deplore in others. One reason for their156 Donald N. McCloskey and J. Richard Zecher
vagueness and that ofeveryone else is that no one standard can be used
for all purposes. The precision required by a speculator might be greater
than that needed by a company making a long-term investment or by a
governmentorinternationalagencytryingtosetanexchangerate, andall
of these standards may be far above that required for satisfaction by
devotees of purchasing-power parity.
The authors' judgments of the results reported by others are clouded
by the fact that they seem to conceive of only two possible conclusions.
Eitherthe theory is a "success" and is graded A +,orit is a failure and is
graded F. They seem to be determined to come out with a grade of A +
and to think that all analyses that find deviations from purchasing-power
parity imply a grade of F. In fact, most of the studies they cite seem to
imply judgments of B or C rather than total success or failure.
In summary, my reaction to the two tests of purchasing-power parity
proposed by the authors is that one test cannot be failed and that the
other test, conducted with the right type of data, usually is failed.
Fortunately, there is another theme to the paper, although it is
obscured by the extravagant claims madefor purchasing-power parity. It
is theimportantandreasonableonethat"itis hardtobelievethatforeign
prices or interest rates did notmatter. It is hard to believe that American
prices and interest rates are notat all constrained directly by the forces of
arbitrage," and "it[purchasing-powerparity] is notso greata failure that
macroeconomics can go on ignoring the rest ofthe world." If that is the
pointthe authorsreallywanttomake, evenmanyskepticsaboutpurchas-
ing-power parity could agree.
Note
1. Some of these were referred to in the article (Kravis and Lipsey 1978) quoted by
McCloskey and Zecher; we might add to the list Kravis and Lipsey 1982. Ofcourse, similar
studies by many others of price elasticities in trade have yielded similar results.
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Comment Milton Friedman
I believe that a fundamental confusion runs through the McCloskey-
Zechertreatment, both in this paper and in their earlierpaper-aconfu-
sion betweentwo verydifferentpropositions. Onepropositionis whether
the quantity of money in a country is an endogenous or an exogenous
variable-an important and very interesting question. There is no doubt
that in a world of fixed exchange rates and stable barriers to trade, the
quantityofmoneyin eachcountryseparatelyis ultimatelyan endogenous
variable. That proposition is perfectly clear and everybody has accepted
it for alongtime. It'sthe propositionthat Keynes presentedso well in the
appendix to his Tract on Monetary Reform ([1923] 1971), that there are
three things ofwhich acountrycanchoose any two: stableinternalprices,
stable exchange rates, and free trade. You can't have all three; you can
have only two. That proposition is critical.
It should be noted, however, that while the quantity of money is
ultimately an endogenous variable, there can be and is much leeway in
the short run, before the external forces overwhelm the independent
internaleffects. Andwe have repeatedly beensurprised in ourstudies by
how much leeway there is and for how long-frequently a number of
years.
There's a very different proposition that is easily confused with the
endogeneity orexogeneity ofthe quantity ofmoney, namely, ifmoney is
endogenous, there is no causal relation between money and prices. That
is awhole differentproposition. Whatevermay determinethequantityof
money within a country, that quantity of money may still largely deter-
mine-orat least, be theconduitthroughwhich otherforces determine-
prices within a country. The confusion between these two wholly differ-
ent propositions is apparent in the statement by McCloskey and Zecher
that "ifpurchasing-power parity is found to be a useful characterization
of the world"-and they should have added "and fixed exchange rates
characterize the world"-"then closed-economy theorizing and empiri-
cal work in macroeconomics should be changed to allow for the direct
effects ofinternational price arbitrage. Whether monetarists or Keynes-
ians or rational expectationists, economists should begin thinking and
measuring in global terms" (p. 127). Economists have consistently
thought and measured in global terms in examining the determinants of
the quantity of money in a country, both for periods of fixed exchange
rates and ofdirty floating-and McCloskey and Zechercite no examples
to the contrary. In respect of the second proposition, the money supply
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may be endogenous after a sufficient interval, yet not in the short run.
And whether endogenous or exogenous, the domestic money supply is
absorbed primarily within the domestic economy; it is highly fruitful to
examine the process whereby that occurs and the relation within a coun-
try between changes in the money supply and changes in othervariables.
There is no such sharp dichotomy between "closed economy" and
"global" thinking and measuring as the straw man set up by McCloskey
and Zecher.
Some findings from Anna Schwartz's and my book Monetary Trends
are relevant to this subject. We calculated correlations between the
United States and the United Kingdom in the rates ofchange ofvarious
variables betweencycle phasesfor almost a century. We pointedout, and
this is strictly in accord with the McCloskey-Zecher view, that the cor-
relation between prices in Britain and the United Statesis closer than the
correlation between any other two magnitudes. It is closer than the
correlation between money supplies in the two countries, closer than
thecorrelationbetweenincome in the two countries, realornominal. We
stressed that that result is strictly consistent with what they call our
Martian view of the economy, and indeed dema·nded by it. Because, we
said, in a world of fixed exchange rates, the money supplies in the
different countries have to accommodate themselves in such a way as to
be consistent with equality of prices and goods among countries. And
therefore, the relation between the quantity of money in the two coun-
tries would be expected to be less close than between prices because
changes in the demand curve for money within an individual country
must be accommodated by changes in moneyratherthanin prices (Fried-
man and Schwartz 1982, pp. 310-15).
Let me turn to a couple ofother points. First, McCloskey and Zecher
assert that "the turbulence ofthe 1920s and 1930s, which is said to have
loosened the economic ties among nations, appears not to have done so"
(p. 139).
One comparison in our book supports a very different conclusion. We
started with the Kravis, Heston, and Summers estimate for the purchas-
ing-power-parity exchange rate between the United States and the
United Kingdom in 1970. We used price indexes in the two countries to
extrapolate the purchasing-power exchange rate annually from 1870 to
1970. We then calculated the ratio of the purchasing-power-parity ex-
change rate to the market exchange rate.
The resulting chart is fascinating (Friedman and Schwartz 1982, chart
6.5, p. 291). Before about 1932, the ratio ofthe purchasing-power-parity
exchange rateto themarketexchange ratevariedwithin a range ofplusor
minus 10 percent. All ofus would say that is a fairly close relationship to
purchasing-power parity. After 1931, the range is between minus one-
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doubt that a comment by Jacob Frenkel is right: Hume traveling in the
1950s would have found more deviations from purchasing-power parity
than he would have found in the 1780s. Exchange controls, tariffs, other
impediments to trade were far more importantin dividing the world than
improvements in communication and other technologies were in uniting
it. I don't see that notion is any contradiction to the purchasing-power-
paritytheoryofexchange rates. Itis simply a consequenceofthe fact that
there has been an enormousincrease in barriersto tradeamongcountries
since 1931.
I want now to discuss two particularepisodesfor which McCloskeyand
ZechertakeAnnaSchwartzandme totaskforouranalysisinA Monetary
History (1963). The first example is resumption in 1879. They quote our
statement that "itwould be hardto find a much neaterexample in history
of the classical gold-standard mechanism in operation" (p. 99). Their
look at that episode on the basis ofmonthly data is interesting and most
welcome, but on closer examination it does not, contraryto their claims,
contradict our interpretation of the episode.
McCloskey and Zechercompareprice rises to inflows ofgold, conclud-
ing, "In the monthly statistics ... there is no tendency for price rises to
follow inflows ofgold . . . ;ifanything, thereis aslighttendencyfor price
rises to precede inflows ofgold, as they would if arbitrage were shortcut-
ting the mechanism" (p. 126).
Their comparison is the wrong one for determining whether prices
were reacting to arbitrage ratherthanreflectingchangesin thequantityof
money. For that purpose the relevant comparison is with the quantity of
money. Goldflows are relevant only as a proxyfor thequantityofmoney.
Ifwe comparepricerises with changesin thequantityofmoneydirectly, a
very different picture emerges than McCloskey and Zecher draw (see
table C2.1). Our basic estimates ofthe quantity ofmoney for this period
are for semiannual dates, February and August. Resumption took effect
on 1 January 1879. From August 1878 to February 1879, the money
supply declined a trifle, continuing a decline that had begun in 1875 in
final preparation for resumption. From February 1879 to August 1879,
the moneysupplyrose sharply, according to ourestimates, by 15 percent.
TheWarren-Pearsonmonthlywholesale price indexfell in thefirst halfof
1879, reflecting the earlier decline in the money stock. It startedits sharp
rise in September 1879, or at least seven months later than the money
supply.1
As to gold, the total stock ofgold, as well as gold held by the Treasury,
had been rising since 1877 as partofthe preparationfor resumption. But
it had been rising at the expense of other components of high-powered
money, which actually fell slightly. However, the decline in the money
stock before 1879 had been due primarily to a decline in the deposit-
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both ratios rose, which enabled the stock of money to rise despite no
initial increase in gold flows. The large step-up in gold inflows in the fall
of 1879, to which McCloskey and Zecher call attention, was mostly
absorbed in raising the fraction of high-powered money in the form of
gold rather than in speeding up monetary growth.
Table C2.1 shows these developments in more detail.
On the basis of this reexamination, I am inclined to repeat the state-
ment in our Monetary History, "It would be hard to find a much neater
example in historyoftheclassicalgoldstandardmechanismin operation"
(italics added), at least on a sophisticated interpretation ofboth the gold
standard mechanism and the historical data.
At any rate, the gold standard mechanism, as I understand it, has
always incorporated a variety of channels of adjustment, subject to
different lags. Any result one wants can be gotten, depending on the
relative speed of adjustment of the various channels. It is an important
scientific question to try to identify and isolate these relative speeds of
adjustment. I believe that McCloskey and Zecher make a real contribu-
tion in examining aspects of that issue.
The second episode is the behavior of prices after the u.s. went off
gold in 1933. The figure 2.3 shows a close parallelism betweenthe weekly
movements of wholesale prices and the exchange rate. However, the
different scales used for theprice index andtheexchange rate in the chart
give a misleadingimpression?Forexample, from April 1933 toJuly 1933,
wholesale prices rose less than a sixth, the exchange rate by nearly a half,
yet the total impression from their chart is that prices rose more sharply.







Relations between U.S. Prices, Money, High-Powered Money,
and Gold, 1878-80
Whole- High-
sale Money powered Gold
Prices Stock Money Stock
(P) (M) (HPM) (G) MIHPM GIHPM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
90 1.57 0.767 0.182 2.05 0.24
88 1.55 0.752 0.198 2.06 0.26
86 1.78 0.815 0.219 2.18 0.27
105 1.94 0.897 0.302 2.16 0.34
97 2.05 0.972 0.378 2.11 0.34
Sources: Col. (1) U.S. Bureau ofthe Census 1949, app. 24, p. 344; col. (2) Friedman and
Schwartz 1970, p. 5; col. (3) Friedman and Schwartz 1963, p. 799; col. (4) ibid., notes to
table A-I, p. 723 and table A-3, p. 765.
Notes: Col. (1) Warren-Pearson index of wholesale prices (191~14 = 100); col. (2)
currency held by the public plus adjusteddeposits ofcommercialbanks (billions ofdollars);
col. (3) in billions of dollars; col. (4) in billions of dollars.161 The Success of Purchasing-Power Parity
how much narrower the relative movement in the wholesale price index
was than in the exchange rate. In any event, as McCloskey and Zecher
note, we pointed out in A Monetary History that there was a direct effect
of devaluation on prices. However, the existence of a direct effect on
wholesale prices is not incompatible with the existence of many other
prices, as Moe Abramovitz has remarked, such as non-tradable-goods
prices, thatdid notrespondimmediatelyorrespondedto differentforces.
An index of rents paid plotted against the exchange rate would not give
the same result. An index of wages would not give the same result.
Itmay beworth quotingwhatwe actuallysaidontheissue, especiallyin
view ofthe McCloskey-Zecher comment on a quotation from the Mone-
tary History that "this is an unusual line ofreasoning for such crusaders
against mixing up the determination of relative and absolute prices"
(p. 141).3
Here is what we said: "Theaim ofthe gold policy was to raise the price
level ofcommodities, particularly farm products and raw materials....
Most farm products and raw materials exported by the United Stateshad
a world market in which this country ... was seldom dominant....
Hence, the decline in the foreign exchange value of the dollar meant a
roughly proportional rise in the dollar price ofsuch commodities, which
is, of course, what did happen to the dollar prices of cotton, petroleum
products, leaftobacco, wheatandsimilaritems" (Friedman and Schwartz
1963, pp. 465-66).
Thirty-odd pages later, after noting that the rise in the implicit price
index from 1933 to 1937 was ofroughly the same orderofmagnitude as in
1879-82 and 1896-or 1897-99, but in wholesale prices decidedly larger:
"What accounts for the greater rise in wholesale prices in 1933-37,
despite a probably higher fraction of the labor force unemployed and of
physical capacity unutilized than in the two earlier expansions? One
factor, already mentioned, was devaluation with its differential effect on
wholesale prices" (p. 498). This was followed by the passage McCloskey
and Zecher quote in which we referred to "theimplicit measures to raise
prices andwages undertakenwithgovernmentencouragementandassist-
ance" (p. 498).
Contraryto the impression McCloskey and Zechergive, we did not try
to assess the relative importance ofvarious factors in explaining the rise
in pricesfrom 1933 to 1934---theperiodto which theylimit theirchartand
discussion. Onthecontrary, we explicitly cited these measures as helping
to explain the "rise in wholesale prices in 1933-37." The wholesale price
index continued to rise after its initial sharp rise in 1933 and did not reach
its peak until mid-1937 when it was 47 percent above its low point in
February 1933 and 28 percent above its level in July 1933. Hence there
was ample time for the factors we referred to to play their part after the
enactment of the legislation we listed.162 Donald N. McCloskey and J. Richard Zecher
Note finally that McCloskey and Zecher have faced up in this paper to
the problem offloating or flexible exchange rates to only a very minimal
extent. Thispaperis writtenprimarilyfor a worldoffixed exchange rates,
and indeed, fixed exchange rates with nonchangeable barriers to trade.
To be applicable to the current world, those elements must be added.
Notes
1. This paragraph and the next two were added after the conference in revising my
comments for publication.
2. This sentence and the next two were added in revising these comments for publica-
tion.
3. This paragraph and the next three were added in revising these comments for
publication.
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General Discussion
ABRAMOVITZ suggested another way ofposing the question that lies at
the heart of the McCloskey-Zecher paper: How can tradable-goods
prices remain equal to one another or move in similar ways in different
countries without destabilizing the gold standard, in the face ofdiffering
national and sectoral rates of productivity growth? Abramovitz pointed
out that McCloskey and Zecher offer one possible adjustment mech-
anism. In contrast, the traditional specie-flow mechanism, involving
changesinpricesand nominalwagesindifferentcountries, offersa rather
different mechanism.
MCCAULEY asked McCloskey and Zecher to justify the leap from
purchasing-power parity, however defined, to the assertion that mone-
tary policy cannot alter prices. This assertion appears in weak form (p.
146)-that American prices are not at all constrained by the forces of163 The Success of Purchasing-Power Parity
arbitrage-and in rather stronger form (p. 128)-that American price
levels are exogenous to Americanmonetarypolicy. Surely as theshareof
world output produced by a single country approaches unity, an indi-
vidual country's monetary policy becomes capable of raising prices.
McCauley argued that these questions imply technical objections to
McCloskey and Zecher's analysis. While McCloskey and Zecher analyze
the residuals from their purchasing-power-parity equation, their proce-
dure presumes thatU.S. monetarypolicy is incapableofinfluencingprice
levels in the rest of the world.
ZECHER responded that the Zecher-McCloskey paper effectively in-
corporatesMcCauley'spoint. In response to Friedman, Zecherdisagreed
with his statement that McCloskey and Zecher fail to take into account
the difference between periods of flexible and fixed exchange rates.
Under flexible exchange rates, McCloskey and Zecher's assertion is not
that a country cannot affect its own price level or rate of inflation, but
rather that relative prices, or the deviation from purchasing-power par-
ity, is constrained by arbitrage in commodity and other markets. Thus,
their analysis is capable of dealing with flexible-exchange-rate periods.
FRIEDMAN restated the central point ofhis argument: suppose a coun-
try's moneysupply is endogenous, determinedby the outside world. One
can still examine the relationship between the quantity ofmoney in that
country (call it Illinois) andthe price level and nominalincomein Illinois.
The change in the quantity of money, however produced, has effects
internal to Illinois.
MCCLOSKEY responded that all monetarists share a belief in a stable
demand for money. But to go from the presumption that money demand
is stable to the assertion that money supply in Illinois determines prices
and interest rates in Illinois is a large jump.
FRENKEL raised the question of what exactly McCloskey and Zecher
mean when they speak of purchasing-power parity? He suggested that
McCloskeyandZecheressentiallymeanthelawofoneprice. Purchasing-
power parity· is enforced by the mechanism of commodity and asset
arbitrage, converting the whole discussion of purchasing-power parity
into a discussion of financial flows and profit opportunities.
Frenkel suggested posing a very different question, which was the
original question underlying the development of purchasing-power par-
ity: How can one determine an appropriate exchange rate for the period
following a serious market dislocation? How much information can be
obtained from aggregate price indexes? One issue is which "aggregate"
to look at. Needless to say, this question is basedonthe presumptionthat
aggregates provide useful information for determining equilibrium ex-
change rates; changes in relative prices call this view into question. The
crucial question, therefore, is under what conditions it is likely that
aggregate price indexes will provide useful information about equilib-164 Donald N. McCloskey and J. Richard Zecher
rium exchange rates? It may be very important to know whether the
shocks to the system originate from the real side or from the monetary
side.
Inthewakeofmonetaryshocks, Frenkelargued, itis advisable to focus
on the aggregate that best represents monetary conditions. This view
suggests looking at the price indexes that cover the broader domain of
goods and services, which is what Cassel had in mind. In his view,
purchasing-power paritywas not a theoryofindividualprices butofprice
indexes becauseit was intendedas a measureofthemonetaryconditions.
His view is fundamentally different from the view that foreign exchange
rates have nothing to do with aggregate price levels but only with indi-
vidual commodity prices.
Frenkel pointed out that the original view ofpurchasing-power parity
refers to the ratio of rates of inflation of purchasing power, where
inflation is to be understood as inflation ofthe quantity ofmoney. These
concepts are completely divorced from individual commodity prices per
see
Frenkel made a number ofpoints concerning McCloskey and Zecher's
econometric results. Oneinterestingexercise in theirpaperasks whether
deviations from purchasing-power parity have real effects? McCloskey
and Zecher choose to concentrate on the trade balance; they ask if there
is a visible, statistically significant relationship between apparent devia-
tions from purchasing-power parity and the trade balance. They find no
suchevidence. Frenkelhesitatedto inferfrom these results any particular
conclusion about purchasing-power parity, since it is not clear that
changes in relative prices should always have a particular trade-balance
effect. If one thinks of the current account as the difference between
income and spending, then there is a determinate theory that links
changesin therelative pricesofcommoditiesto the aggregate saving ratio
andhencetothecurrentaccount. Thereis a determinatelink betweenthe
terms of trade and the current account-the so-called Laursen-Metzler
effect. However, underavarietyofplausiblecircumstances, theLaursen-
Metzler effect might not hold.
ZECHER responded to Frenkel by emphasizing the importance ofques-
tioning the extentto which national markets areintegrated. The problem
with many recent empirical studies, he suggested, is that after concluding
that purchasing-powerparityfails, subsequent theorizing simply neglects
the rest of the world. It is important to attempt to define criteria that
permit one to label markets as more or less integrated.
PIPPENGER pointed out that several economists have analyzed the re-
siduals from purchasing-power parity calculations. He himself had ex-
amined deviations from purchasing-power parity using annual data,
going back in some cases to the 1870s. The evidence indicates that
deviations follow a random walk. There appears to be no tendency for165 The Success of Purchasing-Power Parity
relative prices to return to any normal long-run level. This random-walk
property holds even for the regional price indexes within the United
States, which is indeed curious. Ofcourse, this result is inconsistent with
the continuous maintenance of purchasing-power parity, because the
result permits exchange rates to drift in any direction. It also raises some
interesting questions about the proper way of interpreting time-series
data. One possible interpretation is that purchasing-power parity simply
fails to hold. Another, suggested by Richard Roll, is that the random-
walk property is evidence of efficient commodity markets. This latter
interpretation would suggest that Zecher and McCloskey are right, but
for a different reason. Whatwe may beseeing is simply the fact thatprice
indexes for different countries are made up of different commodity
bundles. Many problems must be sorted out before we can distinguish
between the traditional view and the Zecher-McCloskey view.
BRUNNER argued that one may wish to distinguish a shorter run,
perhaps up to one-and-a-halfortwo years, overwhich the moneystock is
exogenous, and a longer runoverwhich it is endogenous. Supportfor this
distinction can be found in the history of the Italian monetary affairs in
the 1960s. At that time there were a number of one-and-a-half- or
two-year periods when macroeconomic accelerations were fueled essen-
tially by the domestic-credit component of the monetary base. Such
credit creation was able to alter the money supply for one-and-a-half or
two years with accompanying adjustments in prices. Only thereafterwas
the balance of payments affected. Such lagged responses are quite con-
sistent with some of the adjustment mechanisms sketched here.
DORNBUSCH suggested thatMcCloskey and Zecherhadprovidedinsuf-
ficient room in their framework for the considerations emphasized by
Abramovitz. When an economy is growing and the composition ofactiv-
ity is changing over time, simple tests ofpurchasing-power parity will be
biased. For example, anyone who tests the purchasing-power-parity
hypothesis for the last twenty years will find that real exchange rates in
manufacturing, ofthe United States as well as ofany otherindustrialized
country, are well explained by differentials in sectoral growth rates but
not by national rates of price inflation. Therefore, serious tests of pur-
chasing-power parity must incorporate time trends or other variables
designed to account for differentials in sectoral growth rates and other
real changes.
Dornbusch also drew attention to the financial research of the last
three years, which demonstrates that one cannot reject the hypothesis
that the stock market devia~es for long periods from market fun-
damentals. On purely statistical grounds, even fifty years of Dow-Jones
data are incapable of rejecting, at a .99, a .95 or even a .90 level of
confidence, the hypothesis that the stock market is driven for long pe-
riods by fads and fashions.166 Donald N. McCloskey and J. Richard Zecher
MCGOULDRICK askedwhetherempiricaltests ofpurchasing-powerpar-
ity should include in the price indexes notonly the prices ofgoods butthe
prices of securities.
MCCLOSKEY agreed that in principle the capital market should be
considered in studies of purchasing-power parity. He pointed out that
Lipsey takes the McCloskey-Zecher analysis ofpurchasing-power parity
as an empirical test and argues that it is notin fact properlyinterpreted as
a statistical test of a hypothesis. Rather, the analysis is better thought of
as a way oflooking at particularepisodeswhich might persuadepeopleof
the plausibility of a particular view of how markets function.
McCloskeysuggested thatFriedmanwas in substantial agreementwith
the authors' main point. Friedman concedes that under fixed exchange
rates the money supply ofIllinois does not determine prices and interest
rates in Illinois. That was McCloskey and Zecher's main point.
FRIEDMAN referred back to some ofthe work in his recent bookwritten
with Anna Schwartz. Friedman and Schwartz discovered an appreciable
difference in the relation between interest rates in the United States and
United Kingdom before 1896 and after 1896. Interest rates in the United
States before 1896 are much higher relative to the British interest rates
than after 1896. In other words, before-1896 interest rates act as if there
was widespread anticipation of a depreciation of the U.S. dollar. After
1896, they act as if there was widespread expectation of an appreciation
ofthe U.S. dollar. This behavior bears on the question ofwhether there
can be significant deviations in prices and interest rates in various coun-
tries over substantial periods of time.
FRATIANNI suggested parallels with the Italian experience. In Italy, he
argued, systematicdeviationsfrom purchasing-powerparity are matched
by deviations from interest-rate parity. Also, the way in which govern-
ments finance budget deficits should be accounted for in regressions.
GREGORY reported an experiment conducted by himselfand colleagues
(Baltagi and Sailors) at the University of Houston. They estimated a
three-equation model, pooling thirty-four cross-section time-series
observations for seven countries (France, Germany, Japan, Russia,
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States), to investigate the
working of the gold standard. The model included a money-demand
equation, a balance-of-payments equation, and a money-supply equa-
tion, with all variables expressed as first differences. The pooled regres-
sion results suggest that the classical gold standard was a fairly simple
system, not the complex one that Bloomfield reported. According to the
model, if supply shocks were to set off domestic inflation, domestic
inflation would then cause a worsening of the external balance, and a
worsening of the external balance would cause the domestic money
supply to drop. While the pooled model yielded these statistically signifi-
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yielded generally insignificant coefficients. Gregory suggested that
pooleddatamight serve as an avenuefor expandingtheempiricaldataset
in exploring the working of the classical gold standard.
THOMAS raised a major question with respect to the model that Greg-
ory described. Anoutstandingcharacteristicofthe period 1880-1913was
the unique role ofGreatBritain in the Atlanticeconomy, as majorcapital
exporter and center of what was virtually a sterling standard; her status
was different in kind from that of the borrowing countries of the
periphery. In 1880 the United Kingdom was responsible for 41 percentof
world exports ofmanufactured goods as against 3 percent for the United
States; even as late as 1889 the U.K. share of world exports of capital
goods was 44 percent as compared with the U.S. proportion of 23 per-
cent. A unique feature of the growth process was the fact that the long
swings in capital formation, productivity, and real income in the center
country, Great Britain, were inverse to the corresponding long swings in
the borrowing countries of the periphery. The voluminous evidence
confirming the validity of these inverse long swings was summarized by
Arthur Bloomfield in his well-known Patterns ofFluctuation in Interna-
tional Investment before 1914 (1968). No account of the working of the
international gold standard can afford to neglect these special features of
the pre-1913 period.
Five of the seven countries on which the pooled model was tested-
Germany, France, Sweden, Russia, and Japan-were not Atlantic-
oriented either in trade or foreign lending, so that only two-Great
Britain and the United States-reflectedthe special characteristics ofthe
pre-1913 international economy, namely, the center-periphery interac-
tion. However, the way the model was specified made it impossible to
pick up this interaction. The pooled results have drowned the peculiarity
ofBritain's interaction with the United States in general averages for the
seven countries.
The working ofthe international gold standard between the "regions"
of the nineteenth-century Atlantic economy has a close resemblance to
the working of the internal gold standard between the regions of the
United States. Under this internal standard the ease of adjustment was
greatly facilitated by the existence of two fundamental conditions-free
interregional migration of labor and the transfer of Treasury funds into
weak regions. Among the most important reasons why the international
gold standard worked fairly smoothly were, first, the high degree of
international mobility of labor and, second, the fact that Britain, the
dominant creditor, with a high propensity to import, was always putting
money back into international circulation, either through a substantial
upswing in imports or through a substantial upswing in foreign lending.
Thomas also commented on the McCloskey and Zecher paper. Pro-
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economy, McCloskey and Zecher emphasize what they regard as the
necessary corollaries-unifiedprices ofproducts, assets, andlaboracross
nationalboundaries. Hencethemonetarytheory, which is anequilibrium
model; but the theory overlooks some awkward facts. One has to recog-
nize the nature ofthe growth process in the pre-1913 Atlantic economy,
particularly the inverse relation between investment upsurges in the
center country and in the overseas country of new settlement. Export
capacity in a given phase of the long swing was a function of the infra-
structure investment in that country in the previous swing. There was a
long-run symbiotic relationship, but it necessarily entailed opposite
movements at the center and the periphery, and serious disequilibria
when the peaks ofthe long swing were reached and the BankofEngland
had to protect its reserve. This process would occur particularly when
under-effected transfer was experienced. The U.S. trade balance deter-
mined the gold flow, and the gold flow determined the rate ofgrowth of
the money supply. There is no basis for the notion that investment
upswings, by generating excess demands, attracted net capital inflows
that more than offset the unfavorable trade balance, thereby inducing
gold inflows. Gold inflow, and as a consequence the money supply, rose
most rapidly in the phases of the long swing when U.S. exports were
surging upwards and infrastructure expenditure and imports were in a
downswing. Simultaneously Britain was having an upswing in home
investment, herexports as aproportionofimportswerefalling, and there
was an external flow ofgold from the Bank ofEngland. When it was the
turn of the United States to have its upswing in investment, her trade
balance deteriorated, gold flowed out, and the rate of growth of the
money stock fell.
See what happened during the 1890s. Between June 1892 and June
1896 there was an absolute fall in the U.S. money stock, the first such
decline since the 1870s, whereas the BankofEngland's reserve increased
spectacularly from £15 million to no less than £49 million. When the
United States was struggling desperately to stay on the gold standard,
Britain was enjoying such a surfeit of liquidity that the market rate of
discount was below 1percent. In the second halfofthe 1890s the reverse
happened as a result of the massive upsurge in United States exports in
relation to imports coinciding with the opposite in Britain. The Bank of
England reserve as a proportion of liabilities fell almost as fast as it had
risen, while the money stock ofthe United States went up by 52 percent.
The Old Lady of Threadneedle Street was not managing the interna-
tional gold standard: she was just minding her own business and doing it
on an investment in gold stocks inexcusably small in relation to her
responsibilities. Herstatusas centralbankofthecentercountryendowed
her with clout. McCloskey and Zecher are scornful ofKeynes's descrip-
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regard her as "no more than the second violinist, not to say the triangle
player, in the world orchestra" ("How the Gold Standard Worked,
1880-1913," in The Monetary Approach to the Balance ofPayments, ed.
J. Frenkel and H. G. Johnson. [London: Allen and Unwin, 1976], pp.
358-59). As a superb understatementthatmust constitutesomethingofa
record.
EICHENGREEN elaborated upon one of Brinley Thomas's points. The
purpose of pooling national time series and of attempting international
comparisons is to extract as much information as possible from historical
data. This approachis predicatedupon the assumption thatthestructural
relationships under consideration are identical across countries. In the
case of monetary relations under the classical gold standard, there is
considerable historical evidence of the existence ofimportant structural
asymmetries that would call into question thevalidity ofthis assumption.
Eichengreendrew attentionto theworkofTriffin andothersthatpointed
to the unique degree ofmarket power exercised by the Bank ofEngland
under the classical gold standard and to asymmetries in the impact that
changes in the monetary conditions in different countries had on the
balance of payments of the countries participating in the system. For
example, changes in monetary conditions in Britain appear to have had a
much more powerful impact on short-term capital flows than did compa-
rable changes in monetary conditions abroad. As Triffin suggests, the
Bank of England had an ability to influence international gold flows
unrivaled by othercentral banks. Asymmetries ofthis sort are not taken
into account in Gregory's analysis.
ABRAMOVITZ pointed out that there is no obvious connection between
long swings, such as fifteen-to-twenty-year Kuznets cycles, and interna-
tional gold movements. This is not surprising, since many factors can
substitute for the actual movements ofgold: the growth ofhigh-powered
money from domestic sources, changes in high-powered money multi-
pliers, and changes in the income velocity of money. What, then, pro-
duced the long swings in high-powered money that parelleled so closely
the long swings in the growth rate ofreal output? Abramovitz suggested
focusing on the growth rate of the sum of exports and capital imports.
That sum traces long swings that parallel the long swings in the growth
rate of nominal and real incomes in the United States.
This line ofinquiry suggests a further question: are exogenous changes
in the growth rate of the sum of exports plus capital imports driving the
growth rate ofthe moneysupply andofnominalincome? Oris thegrowth
rate of nominal income determined by independent changes in real
output and world prices to which the money supply of a country must
adjust?
The latter is recognizably the view of the monetary approach to the
balance of payments, which is arguably the right view when one has in170 Donald N. McCloskey and J. Richard Zecher
mind very long periods oftime. In shorter periods, however, and even in
the long swings that run across ordinary business cycles, the answer is
much less clear. In the long swings ofincome in the United States, there
appears to have been. an interaction between the sum of commodity
exports and capital imports which together constitute the positive ele-
ments underlying the balance ofpayments and the real-income changes
with which they are associated. Independent movements of commodity
exports or capital imports stimulated change in nominal income and in
real income as well. The changes in real income, in turn, generated
further increases in capital imports. Within limits, there was a self-
sustaining cumulative process.
Abramovitz noted that the central point, raised by Brinley Thomas,
concerns the inverse pattern of long swings in Britain and the United
States. Abramovitz maintained that there were no inverse swings in real
output or in nominal income in the aggregate in the United States and
United Kingdom. Inpointoffact, the long upswings in the United States
were matched by surges ofcapital export from Britain and capital import
into the United States. Similarly, surges of exports from Britain were
matched by surges of imports into the United States, and declines in
homeinvestmentin Britainwere matched by rises in home investmenton
the other side of the Atlantic. In Britain fluctuations in commodity and
capital export offset one another and left the British economy growing
smoothly over the business cycle, in contrast to the United States where
capital imports and exports were not matched so closely bf surges and
declines in commodityimports and exports. These observations lead to a
further question: Why did the long swings come to an end? Why did they
result in the United States in serious depressions that culminated each of
these episodes, while in Great Britain there were no comparable break-
downs that would have produced, had they occurred, the appearance of
long swings in aggregate output as in the United States? One reason was
the difference between the banking systems of the two countries. At
intervals, the United States suffered banking and financial panics far
more violent than those to which Britain was subject. A more severe
impact on money and real income was felt in the United States. The two
countries, however, differed in other respects as well, and the matter
deserves a lot more study.PART
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